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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's 1936 decision in United
States v. Butler' ushered in an era of unprecedented federal power.
In the preceding 150 years, Congress had gradually increased its
use of money to effect national policy. Early Congresses took a
limited view of the power to spend, excluding such things as
building canals and bridges from its purview. Later Congresses
interpreted their powers more liberally. One by one, matters that
had been considered to be outside Congress' powers or that were
deemed matters of local interest became beneficiaries of the
national purse. These incremental increases were small compared
to the national legislature's reaction to the emergency of the Great
Depression. Congress spent liberally in order to defibrillate the
national economy. Subjects never thought to be in the
congressional purview became the focus of its taxing and spending
power. This issue, whether Congress could apply money to objects
outside its enumerated powers, an issue that had been avoided for
150 years, had finally come to a head.
In Butler, the Supreme Court adopted a construction of
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution
that had been propounded by Joseph Story 100 years earlier.4
Story's view-that Congress' power to tax is limited by the
General Welfare Clause, but once the tax passes muster, Congress
may spend in any way that it deems in furtherance of the general
welfare, even for purposes not set forth in the enumerated
powers -was the key to the New Deal's expansion of
congressional and federal power. The ability to effect policy by
means of the purse and to exercise powers beyond those granted to
Congress in the Constitution, allowed Congress and the federal
government to go where it had never gone before.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (AAA), considered in
Butler, is merely one example." The AAA authorized the Secretary
of Agriculture to levy and collect a tax on the processing of various
agricultural commodities.7 The Secretary was then authorized to
pay the revenues to farmers to reduce the amount of acreage in
cultivation, thus increasing the prices of farm products.8 The
2. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. This part states, "Congress shall have
Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts
and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States;
but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States." Id.
4. 1-2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed. 1891).
5. 2 id. § 923.
6. Butler, 297 U.S. at 53-56.
7. Id. at 54.
8. Id.
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Court was presented with a stark choice between Madison's view
that Congress could spend only in furtherance of its enumerated
powers, and Story's view that it could spend for the general
welfare. The Court summarily rejected the Madison
interpretation in favor of Story's." Nevertheless, in the end, the
Court acknowledged that the regulation of agriculture was a
purely local activity-one committed to the jurisdiction of the
Statesl-and found that the Act violated the Tenth Amendment."
Following on the heels of Butler, and after the "switch in
time," the Court revisited the spending power in Chas. C. Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis" and Helvering v. Davis." Both of these
cases challenged Congress' power to enact the unemployment
insurance and old age pension provisions of the Social Security
Act." In one paragraph of Helvering, the Court cited Butler and
concluded, "Congress may spend money in aid of the 'general
welfare.'" Helvering also established the Court's abdication of
authority in the area of spending." Concluding that the
Constitution authorized Congress to spend for the general welfare,
the Court conceded that questions might remain as to what was
for the general welfare and what was not." These questions were,
however, committed to the legislative branch. The power to
resolve the question of what constituted the general welfare
belonged to Congress alone."
Butler, Steward Machine, and Helvering finally confirmed
Congress' power to spend." Armed in this manner, Congress
9. Id. at 78.
10. Id. at 64. Although this fact is not material to my argument, the
Court's conclusion was certainly superseded by Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 530, 557 (1985) (overruling
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which held "that the
Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to enforce the minimum wage
and over time provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act against states 'in
areas of traditional governmental functions.'").
11. Butler, 297 U.S. at 67-72.
12. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
13. 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
14. Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 573; Helvering, 301 U.S. at 634-35.
15. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640.
16. Id. at 640-41.
17. Id. at 644.
18. Id. at 640.
The line must still be drawn between one welfare and another, between
particular and general. Where this shall be placed cannot be known
through a formula in advance of the event. There is a middle ground or
certainly a penumbra in which discretion is at large. The discretion,
however, is not confided to the courts. The discretion belongs to
Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary
power, not an exercise ofjudgment.
Id.
19. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936); Steward Mach., 301
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tested its power by attaching conditions to spending bills.20 Not
only would Congress spend what it thought best benefited the
nation, without consideration of its enumerated powers, but it
would now compel the recipients of its largesse, the states
included, to refrain from acting in ways only loosely related to the
purpose of the appropriation and wholly unrelated to its
enumerated powers.
The courts ratified this broad conditional spending. Thus,
Congress "enacted" a national speed limit by means of strings
attached to federal highway funds.2  Congress "enacted" a
national drinking age of twenty-one, notwithstanding state laws
and state constitutions that determined that eighteen-year-olds
were adults, and notwithstanding the Constitution's relegation of
the power to regulate liquor to the states."
The Court's ruling in South Dakota v. Dole carried the
spending power another step further." While the Court had
earlier concluded that an independent constitutional bar may limit
Congress' exercise of the spending power," the Dole Court
explained that this meant only that Congress could not, by means
of the spending power, compel another entity to engage in activity
that would violate constitutional rights.' In other words,
Congress could use its spending power not only to exercise powers
that were not delegated to it, but also to exercise some powers that
were explicitly denied. 6
The broad spending power and the power to attach conditions
to it contain no limitation on Congress' ability to abrogate
individual rights guaranteed by the states, so long as those rights
are not found in the federal Constitution. Thus, Congress has
compelled states to dismantle their walls of separation of church
U.S. at 581-83; Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640-43.
20. See infra notes 21-34 and accompanying text for examples of
congressional acts containing spending restrictions.
21. Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 450-51 (9th Cir. 1989). The Ninth
Circuit also concluded that a national speed limit could have been enacted
pursuant to the commerce power. Id. at 451.
22. 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1994). See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12
(1987) (holding that Congress had the power to encourage state compliance
with the minimum drinking age through the Spending Clause).
23. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
24. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-23 (1976) (per curiam); King v. Smith,
392 U.S. 309, 333 n.34 (1968).
25. Dole, 483 U.S. at 210.
26. Id. Congress has thus taxed cattle producers and turned the revenue
over to an industry promotion group. Beef Promotion and Research Act of
1985, 7 U.S.C. § 2901(6)(b) (1994). In other words, "Eat Beefl" commercials
are paid for with an excise tax. See also id. §§ 2701-2718 (1994) (dealing with
egg research and consumer information); id. §§ 3401-3417 (1994) (covering
wheat and food research and nutrition education); id. §§ 4501-14 (1994)
(covering dairy research and promotion).
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and state,27 to violate the privacy provisions of their state
constitutions," and to waive sovereign immunity.2n Additionally,
in return for federal funds, Congress has prohibited citizens from
speaking0 and compelled them to speak in a certain way. 1 The
only limit on Congress' power is that the legislation may not be
coercive.3" If a recipient may turn down federal funds, no matter
how destructive the refusal of funds may be, the act is unlikely to
be declared coercive.83 Congress' power in this area is so widely
recognized that "[n]o one today candidly denies that Hamilton's
view of the spending power was correct."3 4 Notwithstanding its
27. The Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (1994). See Hoppock v. Twin
Falls Sch. Dist. No. 411, 772 F. Supp. 1160, 1163-64 (D. Idaho 1991) (finding
enforceable a provision of the Equal Access Act requiring public schools
receiving federal funds to provide student religious clubs with the same access
to school facilities that other student clubs receive).
28. 49 C.F.R. §§ 651.1-653.83 (1998); id. §§ 654.1-654.83; id. §§ 40.1-40.111;
id. §§ 199.1-199.245; id. §§ 219.1-219.905; id. §§ 382.101-382.605 (discussing
drug and alcohol testing of Department of Transportation employees); Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 625-26 (1989) (holding that
regulations issued by the Federal Railroad Administration authorizing and
requiring tests of employee's blood, urine and breath did not' constitute a
significant invasion of privacy).
29. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 n.1 (1985). See
Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 493 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating "every federal
circuit that has considered this issue also has found . . . [acceptance of
Rehabilitation Act funding] ... to constitute ... [a] waiver of state sovereign
immunity....").
30. See 5 U.S.C. § 1502 (1994) (prohibiting certain state or local officers
from influencing or taking an active part in a political campaign); Act of July
19, 1940, 54 Stat. 767 (1941) (prohibiting certain U.S. officers and employees
from interfering with or affecting the election of the President, Vice President,
presidential elector, member of Senate, member of House or a delegate);
Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 144-46 (1947)
(holding that an order from the United States Civil Service Commission
requiring Oklahoma to remove a member of the Oklahoma Highway
Commission or suffer withholding of federal highway funds because such
member took an active part in political management was not an abuse of
discretion).
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1994) (prohibiting the use of funding programs
using abortion as a family planning method); 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b) (1998)
(providing examples of the limitations placed upon counseling and referral for
abortion services); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991) (finding that
regulations of the Department of Health and Human Services prohibiting
recipients of funds under Title X of the Public Health Service Act from
engaging in abortion activities as a method of family planning did not violate
the First Amendment).
32. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987); Chas. C. Steward
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937).
33. For example, in 1998, federal law provided for payment of roughly 80%
of state highway construction funds. 23 U.S.C. § 120(b)(1), (2) (1994). It also
provided for approximately. 75% of Medicaid funding. 42 U.S.C. §
1396(b)(2)(A) (1994).
34. David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 5 (1994).
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breadth, the spending power has been the subject of little analysis
and commentary. 5  Since Butler and Helvering, few have
questioned the scope of power of the national government to spend
for the national welfare, notwithstanding other limits on national
power implied or expressed by a Constitution of enumerated
36powers.
Until the question was settled in Butler, three interpretations
of the General Welfare Clause persisted: the "strong" Hamiltonian
interpretation, which held that the General Welfare Clause
granted Congress power to enact all laws that it deems for the
general welfare;37 the Madison interpretation, which denied both
the "strong" and "weak" Hamiltonian views, and limited
congressional power to spend and to enact laws pursuant to the
powers enumerated in Section 8;38 and the "weak" Hamiltonian or
Story interpretation, which denied the "strong" Hamiltonian
power, but would grant Congress the power to spend for any
purpose that it deems in furtherance of the general welfare. 9
The proponents of each position offered numerous arguments
to support their favored interpretation. These arguments may be
distilled into three categories. The first is the "I Was There" claim.
This argument relies upon public and private statements of
members of the Philadelphia or state ratifying conventions, or
relies upon their recollections of the intent of the respective
convention."' The second, the "Course of Dealing" argument, relies
upon the acts of Congress or of the Chief Executive in the new
republic to demonstrate the original understanding of the General
Welfare Clause."' The third is the "Appeal to Text" argument that
relies upon the text of the Constitution and employs intrinsic rules
of interpretation.4'
Story employed a persuasive textual analysis to establish his
interpretation of the clause. Since the Commentaries, however, no
one has replicated Story's analysis and, more important, no one
has applied a textual analysis to Story's interpretation. This
35. Id. at 2 n.1.
36. Id. at 5. But cf. CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION
474-79 (1928) (arguing that it is a contradiction to deny Congress the power to
do something, but then grant it the power to spend money to do it).
37. See infra Part III for further discussion of the "strong" Hamiltonian
interpretation.
38. See infra Part IV for further discussion of the Madison interpretation.
39. See infra Part V for further discussion of the "weak" Hamiltonian or
Story interpretation.
40. See infra Part II.A for further discussion of the "I Was There"
argument.
41. See infra Part II.B for further discussion of the "Course of Dealing"
argument.
42. See infra Part II.C for further discussion of the "Appeal to Text"
argument.
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Article will test the three interpretations against the text of the
Constitution, and will discuss historical conditions that add to the
understanding of Article I, Section 8, Clause 1.
In the course of testing each hypothesis, a surprising
conclusion was reached. Story's interpretation is inconsistent with
the text and structure of the Constitution. Madison's
interpretation also fails to survive. As a matter of original
meaning, with historical conditions considered in the mix, both
Madison's and Story's views are flawed. In addition, the "strong"
Hamiltonian view crumbled readily. Before moving to the
discussion of the various views and their relation to the structure
and organization of the Constitution, it is important to first review
the Framers' understanding of the taxing power.
I. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN TAXES, DUTIES, IMPOSTS AND
ExcISES AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE FIRST AMERICAN TAx REVOLTS
It is no accident that the Tax Clause refers separately to
"Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises." These words meant more
to the Framers than their identification of various sources of
revenue. They described two different powers of government: the
power to raise revenue and the power to regulate trade and
commerce for the general welfare.
Before and during the French and Indian War, taxation in the
Colonies was a local affair." Tax bills originated in the colonial
legislatures.' Even when Great Britain sought financial support
from the Colonies, Royal Governors submitted those requisitions
to the Legislatures. 7 Colonial legislatures responded by voting
supplies to the Crown in the same manner as the Parliament.'
In 1764, upon the conclusion of the war with France, this
system changed. Parliament enacted the Stamp Act to
supplement these periodic requisitions. 9 The Stamp Act laid
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
44. Id.
45. EDMUND S. MORGAN & HELEN M. MORGAN, THE STAMP ACT CRISIS:
PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION 4-6 (1953).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 22, 61.
48. Id.
49. 5 Geo. 3, ch. 12 (1765), reprinted in 26 DANBY PICKERING, THE
STATUTES AT LARGE FROM MAGNA CHARTA TO THE END OF THE ELEVENTH
PARLIAMENT OF GREAT BRITAIN 179 (London, Joseph Bentham, 1764). The
Act of 4 Geo. 3, ch. 15 (1764), called the Sugar Act, actually represented the
first revenue measure. Id. at 33. The Colonies, however, apparently viewed
that Act as one regulating commerce, since it imposed duties on foreign
imports. The Sugar Act did, however, give rise to arguments against taxation
without consent largely because of its language, "to raise a revenue." See
JAMES OTIS, THE RIGHTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES ASSERTED AND PROVED
(1764), reprinted in 4 The University of Missouri Studies 303 (1929).
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duties on "all parchment and paper whereon any legal
proceedings, or private instruments of almost any nature
whatsoever, are written," ° as well as upon playing cards,
almanacs, and newspapers.5' These documents were required to
bear a stamp reflecting that the duty had been paid.5 Deeds or
any other papers that did not carry a stamp could not be filed in a
government office.
The Colonies protested loudly and violently, and called for a
Congress to prepare a petition to Parliament protesting the Act.
M
The Stamp Act Resolutions that came from the Stamp Act
Congress of 1765 reveal the colonial view of Parliamentary power
to tax.
55
The Colonies denied Parliament the power to levy taxes on
the Colonies or upon British subjects who resided there.5" They
conceded Parliament's power to regulate relations among the
Colonies, England, and with foreign countries.5 John Dickinson,
the leading critic of Great Britain's exercise of taxing power,
admitted the latter power when he wrote in 1765:
[t]hese regulations it is apprehended, establish the basis of the
British power; and form such a firm connection between the Mother
Country and her Colonies, as will produce all the advantages she
ought to wish for, or that they can afford her. Any further attempt
to shackle some of the colonies in favour of others, or to advance the
revenue in America by restraining her trade, is but regulating by a
severe exercise of power, what wants no regulation, and losing by
too much haste to gain. 5
Daniel Dulaney, another lawyer and pamphleteer, articulated
this same theme, arguing that Parliament had the power to
regulate trade, and that such trade regulation might take the form
of duties and imposts, even though duties and imposts might
50. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
312 (Legal Classics ed. 1983) (1765) [hereinafter BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES].
51. 5 Geo. 3, ch. 12 (1765), reprinted in PICKERING, supra note 49, at 186-
87.
52. Id. at 190-91.
53. Id. at 192.
54. PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION: SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS ON THE STAMP
ACT CRISIS, 1764-1766, 106-13 (Edmund S. Morgan ed., 1959); MORGAN &
MORGAN, supra note 45, at 102-05.
55. The Avalon Project, Resolutions of the Continental Congress October 19,
1765 (visited Oct. 20, 1999) <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/
resolu65.htm>.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. JOHN DICKINSON, THE LATE REGULATIONS RESPECTING THE BRITISH
COLONIES ON THE CONTINENT OF AMERICA CONSIDERED, reprinted in 1 THE
POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN DICKINSON 1764-1774, 216 n* (Paul Leicester
Ford ed., Da Capo Press 1970) (1765).
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produce incidental revenue.59 Nevertheless, he denied Parliament
the power to tax for revenue purposes without the consent of the
colonists.' Though the Colonies might protest onerous trade
regulations on the basis of policy, they protested Parliamentary
taxation for the purpose of raising a revenue on the basis of right.
Thus, the Resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress contended
that no tax could be levied on the colonists by Parliament. 6 Its
argument rested on two grounds: (1) no tax could be imposed on an
English subject without his consent given through his
representative; and (2) circumstances prevented the colonists'
representation in the House of Commons. 62 The eleventh article of
the Resolutions addressed the question of onerous trade
regulations. 6 The Congress did not claim that Parliament lacked
the power to regulate trade. Rather it argued against trade
regulations on policy grounds, stating "the Restrictions imposed by
several late Acts of Parliament, on the Trade of these Colonies,
will render them unable to purchase the Manufactures of Great-
Britain."4
Repeal of the Stamp Act 65 did not end the issue. No sooner
had the Stamp Act been repealed and deeds executed in violation
of it ratified,6 Parliament enacted the Townshend Duties,67
triggering new protests in the Colonies. The Townshend Duties
taxed imports of glass, paper, and other items.' Unlike the Stamp
Act, the duties were not imposed directly on the colonists, but were
reflected in the price of various goods. Because they did not
require payment in specie, they fell less heavily on the colonists.6 9
Like the Stamp Act, however, the Townshend Duties were levied
for "a revenue" to be
raised in your Majesty's dominions in America, for making a more
certain and adequate provision for defraying the charge of the
administration of justice, and the support of civil government, in
such provinces where it shall be found necessary; and towards
further defraying the expences of defending, protecting, and
59. MORGAN & MORGAN, supra note 45, at 85.
60. Id.
61. Id.; Resolutions of the Continental Congress October 19, 1765, supra
note 55.
62. MORGAN & MORGAN, supra note 45, at 106.
63. Id. at 107.
64. Id.
65. 6 Geo. 3, ch. 11 (1765), reprinted in 27 DANBY PICKERING, THE
STATUTES AT LARGE FROM MAGNA CHARTA TO THE END OF THE PARLIAMENT
OF GREAT BRITAIN 19 (London, John Archdeacon, 1767).
66. 6 Geo. 3, ch. 51 (1765), reprinted in id. at 273.
67. 7 Geo. 3, ch. 46 (1766), reprinted in id. at 505.
68. Id.
69. Forrest McDonald, Introduction to EMPIRE AND NATION xii (1962).
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securing, the said dominions ....
Because the Townsend duties were external, referring to
duties levied on various items imported from Great Britain,
colonists felt less troubled by them. 1 This changed with the
publication of John Dickinson's Letters of a Farmer in
Pennsylvania. As to the Letters, Paul Leicester Ford said, "[i]t ran
through the Colonies like wild fire, causing an enthusiasm which
led Town Meetings, Societies, and Grand Juries to vote thanks to
the author; which made him a toast at public dinners, and the
subject of laudatory articles and poems in the press."72
"To the Farmer!" was the toast of the day.7' And it was the
Farmers' views that defined and crystallized colonial objections to
imperial taxation in its various forms. In his first Letter,
Dickinson raised the most fundamental and basic objection to
levies for revenue-that taking the property of an English subject
without their consent, given through their representatives, was a
violation of right." In his second Letter, Dickinson went straight
to the difference between revenue measures and trade regulation.
The parliament unquestionably possesses a legal authority to
regulate the trade of Great-Britain, and all her colonies. Such an
authority is essential to the relation between a mother country and
her colonies; and necessary for the common good of all. . . . We are
but parts of a whole; and therefore there must exist a power
somewhere to preside, and preserve the connection in due order.
This power is lodged in the parliament; and we are as much
dependent on Great-Britain, as a perfectly free people can be on
another.5
Dickinson explained that before the Stamp Act, Parliament levied
duties only for the purpose of regulating trade.
All before, are calculated to regulate trade, and preserve or promote
a mutually beneficial intercourse between the several constituent
parts of the empire; and though many of them imposed duties on
trade, yet those duties were always imposed with design to restrain
the commerce of one part, that was injurious to another, and thus to
promote the general welfare. The raising a revenue thereby was
never intended.76
Following the publication of Dickinson's first two Letters, his
critics contended that there was a difference between internal
taxation, taxes, excises, or duties levied on goods and transactions
70. MORGAN & MORGAN, supra note 45, at 107.
71. MCDONALD, supra note 69, at xii.
72. DICKINSON, supra note 58, at 279.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 309-11.
75. Id. at 312.
76. Id. at 312-13 (citations omitted).
1999]
The John Marshall Law Review
within or among the Colonies, which included the Stamp Act, and
external taxation, such as the Townshend Duties." They argued
that Dickinson had admitted the right of Parliament to levy the
latter.78 The Farmer replied to this in his fourth Letter: "[t]o this I
answer, with a total denial of the power of parliament to lay upon
these colonies any 'tax' whatever."" He explained, "[t]o the word
"tax," I annex that meaning which the constitution and history of
England require to be annexed to it; that is-that it is an
imposition on the subject, for the sole purpose of levying money."s°
Dickinson briefly reviewed the evolution of taxation for
revenue in Great Britain. He argued that history demonstrated
that supplies to the government were "gifts of the people to the
crown, to be employed for public uses."8 According to Dickinson,
little attention was given to the regulation of trade during the
period that gifts to the Crown evolved into taxation for revenue
82purposes. Dickinson explained that "tax" took on its own
meaning, long before Great Britain began to levy duties and
imposts and engage in other forms of trade regulation.3 Finally,
he explained, "[e]xternal impositions, for the regulation of our
trade, do not 'grant to his Majesty the property of the colonies.'
They only prevent the colonies acquiring property, in things not
necessary, in a manner judged to be injurious to the welfare of the
whole empire."'
Dickinson argued that Parliament's revenue acts were
objectionable because Parliament lacked the power to tax the
colonists without their consent.8 Parliament's regulatory acts,
however, were within Parliament's power to regulate relations
among the parts of the Empire and between the Empire and other
nations." Although their severity might be objectionable,
Parliament enjoyed the power to regulate commerce through the
imposition of duties. 7 In his sixth Letter, Dickinson argued that
the difference between regulation measures and revenue acts
ought to be readily apparent "by considering how far they relate to
77. It seems that the distinction first arose when the Colonies were under
the burden of the Sugar Act and anticipating a Stamp Act. They tempered
their criticism of the Sugar Act, but did not complain about the
unconstitutionality of the anticipated Stamp Act. MORGAN & MORGAN, supra
note 45, at 36-37.
78. DICKINSON, supra note 58, at 328.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 328-29.
81. Id. at 330.
82. Id.
83. DICKINSON, supra note 58, at 330.
84. Id. at 332.
85. Id. at 331.
86. Id. at 344.
87. Id.
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the preserving, in due order, the connection between the several
parts of the British empire."8 One thing, according to Dickinson,
is certain: a duty on English goods, payable by the colonists, would
always be for a revenue and, therefore, beyond the power of
Parliament. 9
His views were carried into the First Continental Congress."
In its Declaration of October 14, 1774, Congress complained that
Parliament had imposed taxes "under various pretences, but in
fact for the purpose of raising a revenue."9 Congress, however,
indicated its consent to Parliament's regulation of commerce.
That the foundation of English liberty, and of all free government, is
a right in the people to participate in their legislative council: and as
the English colonists are not represented, and from their local and
other circumstances, cannot properly be represented in the British
parliament, they are entitled to a free and exclusive power of
legislation in their several provincial legislatures, where their right
of representation can alone be preserved, in all cases of taxation and
internal polity, subject only to the negative of their sovereign, in
such manner as has been heretofore used and accustomed: But, from
the necessity of the case, and a regard to the mutual interest of both
countries, we cheerfully consent to the operation of such acts of the
British parliament, as are bona fide, restrained to the regulation of
our external commerce, for the purpose of securing the commercial
advantages of the whole empire to the mother country, and the
commercial benefits of its respective members; excluding every idea
of taxation internal or external, for raising a revenue on the
subjects, in America, without their consent.92
This understanding survived the Revolution. The distinction
between duties levied for revenue and duties levied to regulate
trade appeared in the proposals and deliberations of the delegates
to the Constitutional Convention. While the delegates were ready
and willing to grant a federal government jurisdiction over
interstate and foreign trade, there were limits to how far they
would go. For example, Article VII, Section 4, of the Report of the
Committee on Detail would have prohibited the national
legislature from levying duties upon exports from any state and
upon the importation or migration of persons: "[n]o tax or duty
88. DICKINSON, supra note 58, at 349.
89. Id.
90. See David L. Jacobson, John Dickinson and the Revolution in
Pennsylvania, 1764-1776, 78 UNIV. OF CAL. PUB. IN HIST. 1, 81 (1965)
(contending that Dickinson wrote the resolves of the Continental Congress).
91. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 286 (Richard L. Perry ed., rev. ed. 1978).
92. Id. at 287-88 (emphasis added). Even the fiery Sam Adams would
admit Parliament's power to impose duties and imposts to regulate trade. 1
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, compiled by Kenneth
E. Harris & Steven D. Tilley 63 n.2, 68-69 (1976) [hereinafter JOURNALS OF
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS].
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shall be laid by the legislature on articles exported from any state;
nor on the migration or importation of such persons as the several
states shall think proper to admit; nor shall such migration or
importation be prohibited."9" On August 21, 1774, George Clymer
moved to amend the section by adding "for the purpose of revenue"
after "duty."' This would have had the effect of modifying the
prohibition to permit regulations of trade.95  Luther Martin
supported the amendment because it would permit regulation of
the slave trade.96 The amendment failed. 97
The first clause of Section 4, which prohibited duties on
exports, was approved.98 The Slavery Clauses of Section 4 (those
which addressed the taxation, regulation, and prohibition of the
slave trade) were referred to another Committee of Eleven for
consideration." That Committee reported on August 24, 1787,1°°
with a proposal that carefully limited the power of Congress to tax
or regulate the trade.9 ' The proposal attempted to strike a
balance between those members of the Convention who had
objected to the exemption of the slave trade from imposts and
duties and those members who feared that such imposts and
duties would be used to abolish the trade. 0 2 The dispute was
ultimately resolved by limiting the amount of the tax or duty.
0 3
The Convention thus recognized, but carefully limited, the power
of Congress to levy duties for either revenue or regulatory
104
purposes.
We must keep in mind this difference. When we consider the
three interpretations of the General Welfare Clause, we must
distinguish between a tax levied for the purpose of revenue and a
duty imposed for the purpose of regulation. Before we come to
that subject, however, I shall examine the various forms of
arguments employed in support of the three interpretations.
93. 1-5 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 227
(Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co., 2d ed. 1881).
94. 1 id. at 255.
95. 5 id. at 456.
96. Id. at 457.
97. Id. at 461.
98. 5 ELLIOT, supra note 93, at 456.
99. Id. at 470.
100. Id. at 470.
101. Id. at 470-71.
102. Id.
103. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
104. See James Madison, Madison on the Tariff. Letter 1 (Sept. 18, 1828),
reprinted in 4 ELLIOT, supra note 93, at 600-05 (distinguishing the expressed
power to regulate commerce by duties in the Tax Clause from the implied
power in the Commerce Clause).
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II. THE VARIOUS ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF EACH
INTERPRETATION
A. "I Was There."
Come on brother scribblers, 'tis idle to lag. The CONVENTION has
let the cat out of the bag, Write something at randum, you need not
be nice, Public spirit, Montesquieu, and great Dr. Price,
Down, down, [down derry down].
Talk of Holland & Greece, and of purses & swords, Democratical
mobs and congressional Lords: Tell what is surrendered and what is
enjoy'd, All things weigh alike, boys, we know, in a void.
Down, down, &c.
Much joy, brother printers! the day is our own, A time like the
present sure never was known: Predictions are making-predictions
fulfil, All nature seems proud to bring grist to our mill.
Down, down, &c.'05
The "I Was There" argument seeks authority from the
statements made in the various conventions as well as post-
ratification statements of the delegates. Hamilton, Story, and
others1" appealed to these statements. In my view, these
arguments are entitled to little weight as primary arguments for
or against any view of the General Welfare Clause.
The News-Mongers' Song, which introduced this Section,
illustrates the danger of relying on statements made in support of
or in opposition to ratification. Arguments for and against
ratification flourished. In the end, these arguments tend to cancel
each other out. Madison was in the Convention with Hamilton.
Yet, they arrived at opposite views of the Constitution and the
nature of the nation it created. As Madison put it,
[a]s to the other branch of the subject, I deserted Colonel Hamilton,
or rather Colonel H. deserted me; in a word, the divergence between
us took place-from his wishing to administration, or rather to
administer the Government (these were Mr. M.'s very words), into
what he thought it ought to be; while, on my part, I endeavored to
make it conform to the Constitution as understood by the
Convention that produced and recommended it, and particularly by
105. The News-Mongers' Song for the Winter of 1788, ALBANY GAZETTE, Nov.
15, 1787, reprinted in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION 117 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds.,
State Historical Society of Wisconsin 1983) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY].
106. ANNALS OF CONG. 1727 (Dec. 7, 1796).
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the State conventions that adopted it.1 7
According to some participants, there were three "parties" at
the Philadelphia Convention."8 Nationalists like Hamilton sought
to reduce the states and to lodge an "indefinite power to legislate
in the Congress." °9 Others wanted to limit Congressional power."'
The third faction wished to retain a structure similar to the
Confederation."'
Robert Yates, who attended the Philadelphia Convention,
opposed the Constitution."' He argued in separate essays that the
General Welfare Clause variously conferred an unlimited power to
tax and spend or constituted an unlimited power to legislate. 11
Oliver Elsworth argued the very opposite in the Connecticut
Convention-any exercise of the taxing power for purposes other
than those set forth in the first clause would be void."' Should we
consider these arguments, offered in an attempt to generate
opposition to ratification but rebutted by the federalists, as
authoritative statements or as hyperbole?
The members of the Convention had their own jealousies.
Luther Martin accused Mason and Gerry of trying to sabotage the
Constitution so that their own scheme of government might
replace it."" Martin then engaged in his own sabotage, arguing
that the taxing power would be employed oppressively."6 Some
have suggested that members presented explanations of the taxing
power that furthered their own financial interests.
7
107. Nicholas P. Trist, Memoranda of Conversations with Thomas Jefferson
(Sept. 27, 1834), reprinted in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, 534 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) [hereinafter RECORDS].
108. Luther Martin, "The Genuine Information 11", MARYLAND GAZETTE,
Jan. 1, 1788, reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 639-40 (1993)
[hereinafter THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION].
109. Id. at 195.
110. Id. at 196.
111. Id. at 639-40.
112. Robert Yates & John Lansing, On the Likely Failure of Liberty: The
Dissent of Two New York Delegates to the Philadelphia Convention (Jan. 14,
1788), reprinted in id. at 3-6.
113. Brutus I, N.Y. J., Oct. 18, 1787, reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 108, at 167; Brutus V, N.Y. J., Dec. 13, 1787,
reprinted in id. at 501; Brutus VI (Dec. 27, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 419 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
114. Oliver Elsworth, On the Power of Congress to Lay Taxes (Jan. 7, 1788),
reprinted in 2 ELLIOT, supra note 93, at 190-97.
115. 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 108, at 641.
116. Id. at 650.
117. WARREN, supra note 36, at 470; CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 73-151 (1986).
Beard's view of the dominance of economic and selfish interests has been
effectively criticized. Nevertheless, personal interest did play a role, certainly
in the debates over the payment of Revolutionary War securities. MERRILL
JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE
[33:81
What Spending Clause?
We can safely say that members of the Philadelphia
Convention and of the state ratifying conventions supported or
opposed the proposed Constitution for many reasons, some
personal, some principled, some less than noble. Whether as good
advocates or as good propagandists, convention members seized
the arguments that were available."' Uttering one view or
another cannot be deemed conclusive of what the speaker or any
other delegate intended the Constitution to mean. Nevertheless,
statements of various delegates, often taken out of context, formed
a substantial part of the United States' argument in defense of
congressional power in Butler."9
B. "The Course of Dealing."
"Good roads and canals will promote many very important
national purposes."'2
The Course of Dealing argument appeals to the actions of
Congress or of the Executive in the years following ratification.
Because many members of Congress and two Presidents were
members of the federal Convention, and others were members of
their respective state ratifying conventions (so the argument goes),
the informed actions of the branch to which they belonged reflect
the true understanding of the General Welfare Clause.
The acts of Congress and the Executive constitute this course
of dealing. For example, in 1794, Congress appropriated funds to
aid French refugees from the St. Domingo revolt."' Shortly
afterward, Congress declined to appropriate funds to aid
Savannah, Georgia, following a devastating fire."12 Members of
Congress justified both actions on constitutional grounds.
SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1774-1781,
122-24 (1940) [hereinafter THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION].
118. Saul Cornell, Moving Beyond the Canon of Traditional Constitutional
History: Anti-Federalists, the Bill of Rights, and the Promise of Post-Modern
Historiography, 12 LAw & HIST. REV. 1, 12-20 (1994); Ronald P. Formisano,
Deferential-Participant Politics: The Early Republic's Political Culture, 1789-
1840, 68 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 473, 476-77, 484-85 (1974).
119. See generally Brief for the United States, United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1 (1936) (No. 401), reprinted in 30 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 154-433
(Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK
BRIEFS].
120. See generally James Monroe, Views on the Subject of Internal
Improvements (May 4, 1822), reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MONROE
254 (Stanislaus Murray Hamilton ed., 1902) (emphasis added).
121. Act of Feb. 12, 1794, 6 Stat. 13 (1794).
122. ANNALS OF CONG. 1727 (Dec. 7, 1796). See 3 REGISTER OF DEBATES IN
CONGRESS 752, 758 (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1829) (discussing aid to
Alexandria, Virginia and concluding that it was not authorized by the General
Welfare Clause).
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Supporters of the bills to aid the French asserted that the bills
were within Congress's enumerated powers because they would
offset the United States' debt to France. 1 3 Opponents of the bill to
aid Savannah pointed out that the bill had no such justification
and could not be justified by the General Welfare Clause."
Abraham Baldwin, a federal' Convention delegate from
Georgia, argued in the debates on the Alien and Sedition Acts that
the General Welfare Clause was "introduced to limit the other
parts of the sentence, and [was] not of itself a substantive
power.""' Roger Sherman objected to a proposal to loan funds to
the American Glass Manufacturing Company on the same
constitutional grounds.
2 6
The United States' brief in Butler pointed to the Codfishing
Bounties 127 as proof of congressional ratification of the Story
interpretation.8 Madison supported the bounties, but only on the
theory that they were remissions of taxes, rather than
appropriations to support an industry." Hugh Williamson,
another delegate to the Convention, argued that Congress lacked
the power to pay monies to fishermen in excess of the amount of
the duty.3 ° The Codfishing Act passed only after the House
amended the bill to substitute "allowance" for "bounty,"
3
1
satisfying constitutional objections."'3 Hamilton, as reflected by
his Report on Industries, considered the power to aid industry to
be a natural national power.133
On his last day in office, James Madison in 1817 vetoed a bill
that provided for spending on internal improvements."' Jefferson
celebrated the veto, writing to Albert Gallatin:
[y]ou will have learned than an act for internal improvement, after
passing both Houses, was negatived by the President. The act was
founded, avowedly, on the principle that the phrase in the
constitution which authorizes Congress "to lay taxes, to pay the
debts and provide for the general welfare," was an extension of the
powers specifically enumerated to whatever would promote the
123. ANNALS OF CONG. 170 (Dec. 3, 1793).
124. Id. at 1712-27 (Dec. 7, 1796).
125. Id. at 1967-68 (Nov. 16, 1797).
126. Id. at 1631 (June 3, 1790).
127. Act of July 4, 1789, ch. 2, § 4, 1 Stat. 27 (1789).
128. LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 119, at 427.
129. ANNALS OF CONG. 385-86 (Feb. 6, 1792).
130. Id. at 378-82 (Feb. 3, 1792).
131. Id. at 400-01 (Feb. 9, 1792).
132. See David P. Currie, The Constitution In Congress: The Second
Congress, 1791-1793, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 606, 654-55 (1996) (noting other
enumerated power arguments tendered to support the Codfishing bill).
133. Id. at 655 n.299.
134. James Monroe, First Annual Message (Dec. 2, 1817), reprinted in 1
JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS 589 (Bureau of Nat'l Literature and Art 1913) (1897).
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general welfare; and this, you know, was the federal doctrine.
Whereas, our tenet ever was, and, indeed, it is almost the only
landmark which now divides the federalists from the republicans,
that Congress had not unlimited powers to provide for the general
welfare, but were restrained to those specifically enumerated; and
that, as it was never meant that they should provide for that welfare
but by the exercise of the enumerated powers, so it could not have
been meant they should raise money for purposes which the
enumeration did not place under their action; consequently, that the
specification of powers is a limitation of the purposes for which they
may raise money. I think the passage and rejection of this bill a
fortunate incident. Every State will certainly concede the power;
and this will be a national confirmation of the grounds of appeal to
them, and will settle forever the meaning of this phrase, which, by a
mere grammatical quibble, has countenanced the General
Government in a claim of universal power.135
The following day, President James Monroe took office and
gave further comfort to Jefferson, concluding in his annual
message that Congress lacked the power under the General
Welfare Clause to pay for internal improvements." But Jefferson
was far too sanguine. Within five years, Monroe reversed his
position:
Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts,
and excises. For what purpose? To pay the debts and provide for
the common defense and general welfare of the United States, an
arrangement and phraseology which clearly show that the latter
part of the clause was intended to enumerate the purposes to which
the money thus raised might be appropriated.
13 7
The "Course of Dealing" argument suffers from the same
defect as the "I Was There" claim. The acts of Congress and of the
Chief Executive reflect less of their constitutional philosophies
than the needs of the day. Presidents and members of Congress
offered justifications for legislation and arguments against it that
often did not reflect their underlying purposes for supporting or
opposing it. For every Washington, Hamilton, or Adams who
supported a National Bank there was a Madison, Jefferson, or
Jackson who opposed it, on constitutional or other grounds.1" For
135. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Albert Gallatin (June 16, 1817),
reprinted in THE FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION, supra note 113, at 452.
136. James Monroe, Views of the President of the United States on the
Subject of Internal Improvements (May 4, 1822), reprinted in 1 RICHARDSON
supra note 134, at 713-752.
137. Id. at 713; 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MONROE, supra note 120, at 246.
138. Letter from John Quincy Adams to Andrew Stevenson (July 11, 1832),
reprinted in 17 CONG. REC. 226 (1886); James Madison, Veto Message (Jan.
30, 1815), reprinted in 1 RICHARDSON, supra note 134, at 540; see also infra
note 281 for a discussion on Madison's view that the establishment of a
national bank is not within the powers granted to Congress; LEONARD W.
LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 10 (1988); Thomas
1999]
The John Marshall Law Review
every James Monroe who felt that the General Welfare Clause
authorized spending for infrastructure, there was an earlier James
Monroe who felt that the power was lacking"9 and a corresponding
Congress who would assert constitutional reasons against it."
Our current understanding of the Commerce Clause easily
accommodates spending for public water projects.'4 ' This would
not have been true in 1805; however, it was true in 1818, when
Congress concluded that a power to build roads and canals could
be found in its authority over interstate and foreign commerce as
well as in its duty to raise and support the army and militias, as
modified by the Necessary and Proper Clause.1
4 2
These examples demonstrate that the act of any Congress and
the approval or veto by any President enlarging or restricting the
scope of the General Welfare Clause, represent more of a
determination of what constitutes good national policy than an
interpretation of the Constitution. The acts of Congress and of the
Chief Executive are poor sources of the original intent of the
General Welfare Clause.
C. Originalism, Textualism, Structure and Organization
This leaves us with fewer tools to interpret the General
Welfare Clause; only Story's textual analysis and the extrinsic aid
of historical condition---of pre-ratification history-remain. To be
acceptable, any construction of the General Welfare Clause should
fit the text of the entire Constitution. To make sense, the General
Welfare Clause ought to address the evil that the Framers were
trying to correct. The textual analysis, however, calls for
Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank, reprinted in
WRITINGS 416 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984); Andrew Jackson, First Annual
Message (Dec. 8, 1829), reprinted in 2 RICHARDSON, supra note 134, at 1005,
1025; Alexander Hamilton, Opinion as to the Constitutionality of the Bank of
the United States (Feb. 23, 1791), reprinted in 3 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 180 (New York, Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1885).
139. Compare James Monroe, First Annual Message (Dec. 2, 1817), reprinted
in 1 RICHARDSON, supra note 134, at 587, with James Monroe, Message on
Internal Improvements (May 4, 1822), reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MONROE, supra note 120, at 245-54 (noting that Monroe's original opinion that
Congress' power to spend money should be exercised with other constitutional
powers was later changed). See CHARLES K. BURDICK, THE LAW OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 181 (1922) (noting that James Monroe submitted a
memo stating that he once felt that the power to tax was dependent upon the
other powers delegated to Congress).
140. ANNALS OF CONG. 715-21 (Nov. 23, 1804).
141. See Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 351 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (discussing Congress' appropriation of funds for the reconstruction of
Locks and Dam 26 on the Mississippi River); Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Alexander, 614 F.2d 474, 476 (5th Cir. 1980) (discussing Congress'
appropriation of funds for the construction of the Tennessee-Tombigbee
Waterway).
142. ANNALS OF CONG. 1249 (Mar. 10, 1818).
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consideration of the structure and organization of the document.
Several features of the Constitution's structure and organization
assist in the analysis of the three interpretations.
The structure of the Constitution and its organization tend to
be uniform throughout the document. The first three Articles
assign general powers (i.e. the description of the role of the
branch),"" prescribe qualifications for office,'" set out rules of
procedure (whether for selection of officers or members, or for
conduct of business),45 grant specific powers,' and enumerate
specific prohibitions on the exercise of power."' Each Article
contains its own provision governing compensation of the members
of the Branch.' The Fourth Article governs relations among the
states."" The Fifth governs amendments,0 while the Sixth is a
catch-all or a set of summary rules applicable to the preceding
Articles.'
Thus, Article I, Section 1 assigns the legislative power to
Congress,"' just as the first sections of Articles II and III assign
the executive and judicial powers to the President and Supreme
Court, respectively."' Sections 2 through 5 include qualifications
for office and rules of procedure in the houses." Section 7
describes powers that are specific to each house."5 Section 8 sets
forth the powers of Congress as a whole."' Section 9 enumerates
prohibitions on congressional power. 7 and Section 10 enumerates
prohibitions on state power.
Section 8 is, in effect, a limitation on the plenary grant of
power of Section 1. Section 1 assigns all legislative power "herein
granted" to Congress."' Without the enumerations of Section 8,
the legislative power would be plenary and limited only by the
prohibitions found in Section 9 and in other parts of the
143. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, §1; id. art. III, §1.
144. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1, 2; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, 3; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. The
Judicial article contains no qualifications-its determination being committed
to the Executive and the Senate. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
145. Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. 1, § 3, cl. 5; id. art. 1, § 4, 5, 7; id. art. II, § 3;
id. art. III, § 2.
146. Id. art. I, § 8; id. art. II, § 2; id. art. III, § 2.
147. Id. art. I, § 9; id. art. II, § 4; id. art. III, § 3.
148. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 7; id. art. III, § 1.
149. Id. art. IV.
150. Id. art. V.
151. Id. art. VI.
152. Id. art. I, § 1.
153. U.S. CONST. art. II, §1; id. art. III, §1.
154. Id. art. I, §§ 2-5.
155. Id. art. I, § 7.
156. Id. art. I, § 8.
157. Id. art. I, § 9.
158. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
159. Id. art. I, § 1.
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Constitution.
When grants of power in Section 8 are limited in scope or
definition, the limitation or definition appears in the Granting
Clause. For example, Clause 12 authorizes Congress to raise and
support an army, but limits any appropriation to a period of two
years.60 Clause 8 sets forth the object of promoting the progress of
arts and sciences, but limits the scope of that power by setting
forth the means, for example, granting of patents and copyrights.'61
Clause 16 grants Congress the powers to organize, arm, and
discipline the militia, but these powers are limited by reservations
of power to the States.' 6' In contrast, Clause 2 describes Congress'
power to borrow money as unlimited. 16 Congress' power to make
rules for the government and the armed forces is likewise
unlimited.'
Related powers are not necessarily set out in the same clause.
For example, Section 8 contains no less than four separate clauses
governing the armed forces (including the power to call forth the
militia), but a separate clause governing the militia.' Clause 11,
however, contains three separate grants of power respecting war:
the powers to declare war, to grant letters of marque, and to make
rules governing captures." In short, sometimes the Committee on
Style and Arrangement placed related powers in separate clauses
and sometimes they did not.
The drafters were freely redundant. They granted Congress
the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, in Clause
3, and also granted Congress the power to regulate trade by means
of duties and imposts in Clause 1.167 This redundancy, however, is
understandable in light of their concern about rules of
construction. Two key desires drove the Convention: (1) to ensure
that the national government had the power to raise revenue
independently of the states; and (2) to ensure that the power over
interstate trade was committed to the national government.' 6 The
drafters could grant to Congress the power to lay and collect taxes
and that power would encompass all forms of taxation for revenue,
including duties, excises, and imposts. The omission of "Duties,
Imposts and Excises," however, might be construed as intent to
deny Congress that form of regulatory power. Therefore, they
expressly included it.
160. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
161. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
162. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
163. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
164. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
165. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12-16.
166. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
167. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
168. 1 ELLIOT, supra note 93, at 116-20 (citing to the report of the Annapolis
Convention).
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For purposes of this Article, these three practices are
important. The Constitution's authors were intentionally
redundant. They included limits on a power in the same clause
that granted the power, and they did not consistently include
related powers in the same clause. With these observations in
mind, in the next three sections, this Article will examine the
constitutional text to determine whether the interpretations of
Hamilton, Madison, or Story are correct.
III. THE "STRONG" HAMILTONIAN INTERPRETATION
A. The View Itself
The "strong" Hamiltonian interpretation finds an
independent grant of power in the General Welfare Clause. Under
this view, the Tax Clause grants a power to tax and the General
Welfare Clause grants an independent power to provide for the
general welfare-that is, to enact any law in furtherance of the
general welfare of the United States.9
Attempts to establish such a broad power began in the
Convention. At the outset of the Convention, Edmund Randolph
proposed a limited grant of legislative power-that Congress
"enjoy the legislative rights vested ... by the Confederation...
[and have the power] . . . to legislate in all cases to which the
separate states are incompetent."17 ° General Charles Pinckney
proposed a separate plan. Pinckney proposed to include the power
"to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises." 7'
On June 18, 1787, Alexander Hamilton offered his plan,
although he showed little apparent enthusiasm.1 72 Among other
things, according to Madison's notes, he proposed that Congress
"shall have power to pass all laws which they shall judge
necessary to the common defence and general welfare of the
Union." ' 3  The Convention gave Hamilton their respectful
attention and gave his plan their respectful disregard.
On July 17, 1787, Roger Sherman, who was not a member of
169. 1 STORY, supra note 4, §§ 907-08 n.1.
170. 5 ELLIOT, supra note 93, at 127.
171. Id. at 128. Although a list of enumerated powers appears in the
Journal of the Convention, it is not clear whether they were in Pinckney's
original draft, or whether they appeared for the first time in a version that
Pinckney marked up years later and provided to John Quincy Adams, who was
preparing the Journal of the Convention. Id. at 578. James Madison, to
whom Pinckney gave a copy, concluded that the Journal version was in fact a
later draft after he compared the draft with Pinckney's statements in the
Convention and noted major inconsistencies. Id. at 578-79. Madison
attributed these to Pinckney's failure of memory. Id. at 579.
172. 1 id. at 178-79.
173. 5 id. at 588. The Journal's version records this as "power to pass all
laws whatsoever." 1 id. at 179.
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the nationalist faction, proposed that Randolph's resolution be
modified to state:
[t]o make laws binding on the people of the United States in all
cases which may concern the common interests of the Union; but not
to interfere with the government of the individual states, in any
matters of internal police, which respect the government of such
states only, and wherein the general welfare of the United States is
not concerned.
1 74
According to Charles Warren, several strong nationalists
supported this proposal, including James Wilson, who saw the
opportunity to legislate for the general welfare. 7 '
Gunning Bedford, seconded by Gouverneur Morris, then
moved to include the following language, which provided that
Congress was
[t]o enjoy the Legislative rights vested in Congress by the
Confederation, and moreover to legislate in all cases for the general
interests of the Union, and also in those to which the States are
separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United
States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation. 
176
This proposition passed and the Convention referred it, along
with Randolph's revised resolutions and Pinckney's proposals, to
the Committee of Detail. 177 On August 6, 1787, the Committee
presented the legislative article. 178 It bore little resemblance to
either Randolph's or Bedford's resolutions. The article
enumerated congressional powers, but omitted any mention of
payment of pre-existing debts. 79 At this point in the Convention,
the effort to grant Congress plenary legislative power had failed.
Congressman Henry Tucker, with four generations of the blue
blood of states' rights coursing through his veins, claimed that the
nationalists attempted six times to insert a grant of general
legislative power into the Constitution, without success."8 I have
been able to find five: Hamilton's plan;' Sherman's provision, as
interpreted by the nationalists; ' Bedford's proposal;"s and the
July 26, 1787, Resolution (which is a slight modification of
174. 1 id. at 206.
175. WARREN, supra note 36, at 314-15.
176. Id. at 315.
177. 1 ELLIOT, supra note 93, at 216. The Committee of Detail comprised
Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts,
Edmund Randolph of Virginia, John Rutledge of South Carolina (Chairman),
and James Wilson. 1 DOCUMENTARY, supra note 105, at xlvii.
178. 1 ELLIOT, supra note 93, at 226.
179. Id.
180. Henry St. George Tucker, Judge Story's Position on the So-Called
General Welfare Clause, 13 A.B.A. J. 363, 363 (1927).
181. 1 ELLIOT, supra note 93, at 179-80.
182. Id. at 206.
183. 5 id. at 320.
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Bedford's proposal)."M In addition, it appears that Gouverneur
Morris even stooped to subterfuge, as illustrated by this anecdote
from Albert Gallatin, recounted in the next to last Congress of the
Eighteenth Century.
Mr. G. said he was well informed that those words had originally
been inserted in the Constitution as a limitation to the power of
laying taxes. After the limitation had been agreed to, and the
Constitution was completed, a member of the Convention, (he was
one of the members who represented the State of Pennsylvania)185
being one of the committee of revisal and arrangement, attempted to
throw these words into a distinct paragraph, so as to create not a
limitation, but a distinct power. The trick, however, was discovered
by a member from Connecticut, now deceased, and the words
restored as they now stand. 87
After ratification, some members contended that the presence
of a semi-colon after "excises," found in some drafts of the
Constitution, reflected the official and intended construction and
conferred an independent power upon Congress.1" The engrossed
version, it was eventually agreed, was that containing a comma.
In his 1830 letter to Andrew Stevenson, written over forty
years after the convention adjourned, Madison restated his attack
on the strong Hamiltonian view. When some members of
Congress asserted the strong Hamiltonian position, Speaker of the
House Stevenson inquired as to the meaning of the terms
184. Id. at 375-76.
185. This was Gouverneur Morris, who Madison described as supporting
many of the features of Hamilton's plan. Letter from James Madison to Jared
Sparks (Apr. 8, 1831), reprinted in 3 RECORDS, supra note 107, at 498-500.
186. Gallatin refers to Roger Sherman, who died in 1793. 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1678 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986)
[hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA]. William Samuel Johnson was the Connecticut
member and the Chairman of the Committee on Style. 1 DOCUMENTARY,
supra note 105, at xlvii. He did not pass away, however, until 1819.
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra at 1026. Oliver Ellsworth was Chief Justice of the
United States Supreme Court when Gallatin recounted this story. Id. at 625-
26.
187. ANNALS OF CONG. 1976 (June 19, 1798).
188. Letter from Timothy Pickering to John Marshall (Mar. 10, 1828),
reprinted in JAMES MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 302-03 (1971). In the contended for construction, the Clause
would then read: "[t]o lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; to pay
the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the
United States...." 4 THE JAMES MADISON LETTERS 131 (New York,
Townsend Mac Coun. 1884); 3 RECORDS, supra note 107, at 491. This view
would be resurrected as recently as 1935, when Congressman David J. Lewis,
a sponsor of the Social Security bill, argued that the draft of the Constitution
containing the elusive semi-colon delivered to Washington, ought to be
considered the official draft. 79 CONG. REC. 5688 (1935). He also argued that
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 granted Congress a plenary power to legislate for
the general welfare whether the Clause included a semi-colon or a comma. Id.
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"common defence and general welfare." To this, Madison replied:
I have recd. your very friendly favor of the 20th instant, referring to
a conversation when I had lately the pleasure of a visit from you, in
which you mentioned your belief that the terms "common defence &
general welfare" in the 8th. Section of the first Article of the
Constitution of the U.S. were still regarded by some as conveying to
Congress a substantive & indefinite power; and in which I
communicated my views of the introduction and occasion of the
terms, as precluding that comment on them; and you express a wish
that I would repeat those views in the answer to your letter.'8 9
Madison reviewed the appearances of the phrase in the
Journal of the Convention." He asked, if the General Welfare
Clause conferred a general power upon the Congress, why would
the Convention have gone to such great lengths to describe the
enumerated powers that follow?
The debate continued until 1840, when Justice Joseph Story
published his Commentaries. The Nationalists' efforts to establish
an unlimited legislative power were interred by Justice Story,
whose argument destroyed the "strong" Hamiltonian construction
of Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1.191
B. Why the "Strong" Hamiltonian View Is Wrong
If we assume that the "strong" Hamiltonian view is correct,
then it must comport with the text of the Constitution. For this
analysis, we may look simply to Story's 9' and Madison's 9'
treatment of the claim. If the Constitution grants Congress a
plenary power to legislate for the general welfare, then why go to
the trouble of setting forth numerous enumerated powers? Story
refers us to the common rule of interpretation, which holds that
the parts of an instrument should be construed together so as to
give effect to the whole.'9 This elegant argument destroyed the
"strong" Hamiltonian claim.
The structure and organization of the Constitution reinforces
Story's conclusion. The form of a grant of power definite in scope
becomes significant when we examine the first clause of Section 8.
Clause 1 grants the power "[t]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises..." and nothing more (at least, not
expressly). 95 If we claim that this clause also grants the power "to
189. Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson (Nov. 17, 1830),
reprinted in 3 RECORDS, supra note 107, at 483.
190. 1 JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION: KEPT BY JAMES MADISON 61
(Chicago, Albert Scott & Co. 1893).
191. 1 STORY, supra note 4, §§ 906-11.
192. Id. §§ 909-11.
193. 3 RECORDS, supra note 107, at 486.
194. 1 STORY, supra note 4, § 907.
195. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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pay the Debts," then the power is unnecessarily redundant. For
how are debts incurred? For example, when the federal
government buys gunpowder or a new fighter plane, owes wages to
its officers, or orders materials to erect a building, it incurs a debt.
Yet nowhere in Section 8, Clause 1 do we find the authority
expressly granted "to incur debts." Such a power would have to be
granted to all governmental branches. Additionally, the power
would be subject to the Appropriations Clause. 1
The power to do these things, to incur and to pay debts, is
derived from the Necessary and Proper Clause."' Congress, by
appropriation and in making laws necessary and proper to carry
out all powers vested by the Constitution, authorizes the branches
to incur debts. The authority to incur debts would carry with it
the power to pay debts, also incident to the Necessary and Proper
Clause, or it would have no meaning at all. A Clause 1 power "to
pay debts" would unnecessarily duplicate the powers "[t]o raise
and support Armies,"98 or "[t]o provide for and maintain a
Navy,"' 9 for example. As soon as Congress appropriated funds,
the power to pay debts was granted to the coordinate branch. So,
"to pay the Debts" must refer to the subject debated in the
Philadelphia Convention-the payment of Revolutionary War
debts.
Likewise, if we claim that Clause 1 grants the power to
"provide for the common Defence," then the grants of power found
in Clauses 10 through 16 become unnecessarily redundant.
Clauses 10 through 16 might be considered the means by which to
exercise the broader power of providing for the common defense.
This, however, would be inconsistent with the structure of the
document, which joins the means in the same clause as the object.
Therefore, if "to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence" are not independent grants of general legislative powers,
is "provide for ... the general Welfare" a special case? It would
have to be if we are to succumb to the strong Hamiltonian
interpretation. But the General Welfare Clause suffers the same
defect as the first two sub-clauses. That is, the clauses following
Clause 1 could then only be the means of carrying out the more
general power to provide for the general welfare.
If we admit that the enumerated powers following Clause 1
are the means by which broader powers found in Clause 1 are to
be executed, then we reach the same conclusion-that a power "to
pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States" is limited by those "means" that
follow in Clauses 2 through 17. When we add the Necessary and
196. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 6.
197. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
198. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
199. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
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Proper Clause to the mix, however, those clauses between it and
Clause 1 become useless, since Clauses 1 and 18, considered
together would constitute a complete and plenary grant of
legislative power. Yet we know, if only because of the relation
described by the semi-colons, that these intervening clauses were
intended to have meaning independent of each other.
Thus, we cannot conclude that "to pay the Debts and provide
for the common Defence and general Welfare" are independent
grants of power. Such a conclusion does violence to the
organization of the document. Rather each of the powers are set
out in separate clauses by subject matter, on occasion one subject
being addressed by more than one clause. Under the Hamiltonian
view, the natural result would divide Clause 1 into three separate
clauses.
To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, but all
Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States and no Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be
laid, unless in proportion to the Census or Enumeration
herein before directed to be taken;
To pay the Debts of the United States;
To provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of
the United States."®
Each of these observations militates against the granting of
an independent power by the subordinate clause of Clause 1.
Therefore, the "strong" Hamiltonian view does not survive a
textual analysis. As a result, we then ask ourselves, does the
power to tax imply the power to spend generally? This brings us
to James Madison's interpretation.
IV. THE MADISON INTERPRETATION
A. The Interpretation Itself
The Madison interpretation is more difficult to summarize
because he so often phrased it as a rebuttal to the "strong" and
"weak" Hamiltonian positions. In the course of Madison's debates
with the Federalists, his interpretation developed several
components. First, Madison denied a general power to legislate
pursuant to the General Welfare Clause.'O° Second, he denied a
power to spend beyond the powers enumerated in Article I, Section
200. The Author reaches this conclusion by dividing Article I, Section 8,
Clause 1 into two separate sentences, and by combining Article I, section 9,
Clause 4 with the first sentence of article I, Section 8, Clause 1. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; id. art I, § 9, cl. 4.
201. THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 262-63 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
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8.202 Finally, he admitted a limited spending power in the General
Welfare Clause, but argued that this power was applicable only to
the enumerated powers .2" As we will see, this admission would
later prove fatal to Madison's interpretation.
Madison often argued that the General Welfare Clause was
drawn from the Articles of Confederation, since the phrase
"general welfare" first appeared in the Articles.2°  Benjamin
Franklin was the first to commit a rough sketch of the Articles to
paper. He proposed the following.
The said United Colonies hereby severally enter into a firm League
of Friendship with each other, binding on themselves and their
Posterity, for their common Defence and-Offene, against their
Enemies for the Security of their Liberties and Propertys, the Safety
of their Persons and Families, and their eemmen an mutual and
general Welfare.
The Congress shall also make and .po se such general Regulations
Ordinances as tho' necessary to the General Welfare, particular
Assemblies from their l^^fl ire ... cannot be competent to; viz.
otteh as may rltto to those that may relate to our general
Commerce; or general Currency; to the Establishment of Posts; and
the Regulation of our common Forces. The Congress shall also have
the Appointment of all General Officers, civil and military,
appertaining to the general Confederacy, such as General
Treasurer, Secretary, &c.
All Charges of Wars, and all other general Expences to be incurr'd
for the common Welfare, shall be defray'd out of a common
Treasury, which is to be supply'd by each Colony in proportion to its
Number of Male Polls between 16 and 60 Years of Age; the Taxes for
paying that proportion are to be laid and levied by the Laws of each
Colony. And all Advantages gaind at a . .... -, 205
We know little about Franklin's view of a General Welfare
Clause. Franklin participated in the Albany Convention in 1754.2M
The Albany Plan of Union would have granted powers to a Grand
Council and a President-General.2 7 The plan would have limited
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. The Avalon Project, Articles of Confederation (visited Oct. 25, 1999)
<http://www. yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/artconf.htm>.
205. Franklin's Articles of Confederation (July 21, 1775), reprinted in 2
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 92, at 195-96.
206. Benjamin Franklin, Reasons and Motives For the Albany Plan of Union
(July 1754), reprinted in WRITINGS 383 (The Library of America 1987)
[hereinafter WRITINGS].
207. The Avalon Project, Albany Plan of Union of 1754 (last modified Sept.
14, 1999) <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/albany.htm>.
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these powers to regulating commerce and relations with Indian
tribes, purchasing and selling Indian lands, making laws to govern
settlements established on the newly obtained lands, the raising of
an army when necessary for the defense of any colony, and a navy
to protect trade.2 °8 Any consideration of general welfare did not go
beyond these subjects.
As to Dickinson's Letters, in which a general welfare objection
to Parliamentary taxation was first voiced, Paul L. Ford
contended, "Franklin too, though causing the [Dickinson's] letters
to be reprinted, spoke of them most cautiously in his preface, and
in private seemed neither to understand nor approve of the
doctrines advanced."2" It was not until 1768, when Franklin
defended the American boycott of goods subject to the Townshend
Duties, that we see intimations that Franklin considered Great
Britain's favoritism towards the home islands as a cause of
rebellion.210 From then on, he criticized the Townshend Duties and
similar taxes on general welfare grounds, together with the more
familiar taxation without consent claim.211
By the time of the organization of the Continental Congress,
Franklin came to understand the general welfare in the Dickinson
sense-that even if the Colonies had been represented in
Parliament, Parliament should lack the power to levy indirect
taxes on the Colonies for purposes other than the general welfare
of the Empire. Franklin's 1775 proposal for confederation,
208. Id.
209. 1 DICKINSON, supra note 58, at 281. Dickinson and Franklin, if not
enemies, were certainly adversaries. Franklin was a leader of the anti-
proprietary forces in the Pennsylvania legislature. CHARLES J. STILLU, THE
LIFE AND TIMES OF JOHN DICKINSON, 1732-1808, 38 (Burt Franklin Reprint
1969). Dickinson, while no great friend of the Penns, saw greater danger in
making Pennsylvania a Crown colony, which was the goal of Galloway and
Franklin. Id. at 43-44.
210. Franklin stated:
[i]t is of no importance to the common welfare of the Empire, whether a
subject gets his living by making hats on this or that side of the water;
yet the Hatters of England have prevailed so far as to obtain an act in
their own favour, restraining that manufacture in America, in order to
oblige the Americans to send their beaver to England to be
manufactured, and purchase back the hats loaded with the charges of a
double transportation.
Letter from Benjamin Franklin to the Printer (Jan. 7, 1768), reprinted in
WRITINGS, supra note 206, at 613. Franklin had argued years earlier that it
would make no more sense to tax the Colonies for their defense than it would
to tax the Channel islands for theirs. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to
William Shirley (Dec. 4, 1754), reprinted in id. at 406.
211. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to the Public Advertiser: Rules by
Which a Great Empire May be Reduced to a Small One (Sept. 11, 1773),
reprinted in id. at 694; Letter from Benjamin Franklin to the Printer of the
Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser (Sept. 28, 1768), reprinted in id. at 636-
38.
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however, "had a reception similar to that accorded [to] Galloway's
plan."212 That is, it was received by a Committee of the Wholewithut .213
without action. On June 7, 1776, Congress resolved that a plan
of confederation be prepared.214 On June 12, Congress appointed a
committee "to prepare and digest the form of a confederation to be
entered into between these colonies." 15 The committee consisted of
one delegate from each colony. 16  Dickinson, not Franklin,
represented Pennsylvania on the committee and he prepared the
first draft of the Articles. 17 Consequently, the first draft contained
Dickinson's theories on the concept of general welfare.'18 Under
the proposed Confederation, the Colonies were to unite, "for their
common Defence, the Security of their Liberties, and their mutual
and general Welfare, binding the said Colonies to assist one
another against all Force offered to or attacks made upon them or
any of them, on Account of Religion, Sovereignty, Trade, or any
other Pretence whatever."19 Under the draft proposal, Section XI
stated "[a]ll Charges of Wars and all other Expences that shall be
incurred for the common Defence, or general Welfare, and allowed
by the United States in Ceneral assembled, shall be
defrayed out of a common Treasury. ... 0
Ultimately, Article XI became Article VIII, and remained
largely unchanged.2 21 Article XII of the Dickinson draft clarified
how the Confederation's General Welfare Clause would be
implemented. "Every Colony shall abide by the Determinations of
the United States in General ongres s assembled, concerning the
Services performed and Losses or Expences incurred by every
Colony for the common Defence or general Welfare .... ,222 Article
212. 1 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS 1774-1789, 116 (Paul H. Smith
et al. eds., 1976).
213. Id. at 644; 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 92,
at 195 n.1.
214. 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 425
(Worthington Chauncy ed., Government Printing Office 1906) (1776)
[hereinafter JOURNALS].
215. Id. at 433.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 546 n.1.
218. Id. See Letter from Edward Rutledge to John Jay (June 29, 1776),
reprinted in 4 LETTERS OF DELEGATES TO CONGRESS 1774-1789, 338 (Paul H.
Smith et al. eds., 1976) (stating "I have been much engaged lately upon a plan
of a Confederation which Dickinson has drawn.").
219. 6 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, OCT. 9-DEC. 31, 1776,
546-47 (Government Printing Office 1906). Article I of the Articles stated,
"[t]he Stile of this Confederacy shall be "'The United States of America."'
Articles of Confederation, supra note 204.
220. 5 JOURNALS, supra note 214, at 548.
221. The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union (visited Nov. 11,
1999)<http://www.earlyamerica.com/earlyamerica/milestones/articles/text.
html>.
222. 5 JOURNALS, supra note 214, at 548.
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XII was modified, and its final version, later adopted as Article X,
provided, "[e]very State shall abide by the determinations of the
United States in Congress Assembled, on all questions which by
this Confederation are submitted to them.
223
The Articles of Confederation describe a tax relationship
between the States and the Continental Congress similar to that
which the Colonies sought between themselves and Great Britain.
The Articles denied Congress any power to levy taxes for
revenue.2' The Articles left the power of taxation in the State
legislatures, which would vote supplies to the national
government. 2  Congress' power to requisition funds was limited.
Aside from the support of the civil list and the maintenance of an
army and navy, the Articles limited required State contributions
to charges incurred for the common defense or the general
welfare.226 Under this scheme, the general welfare placed no
limitations on congressional power since Congress had no power to
levy taxes. Instead, the general welfare "limitation" was
guaranteed by the requirement that nine states assent and by the
final veto of any State that declined to vote supplies. 227 Because
the requisition system was unenforceable, this arrangement
ultimately failed.
Under the Articles, a State could incur debts and expenses
that the Confederation could pay, if they were incurred for the
common defense or for the general welfare.2" But here again, the
General Welfare Clause of the Articles was definitional more than
it was limitational. This arrangement became significant when
the Philadelphia Convention thoroughly discussed the issue of the
States' debts. The Convention proposed to pay those State debts
that would have been paid under Article VIII. 22 Madison referred
to this arrangement in his Federalist No. 41, where he explained
that the General Welfare Clause found its source in the Articles of
Confederation.2 0
The Constitution altered this Confederation arrangement in
significant ways. The limitation on the powers of the national
government was now found primarily in its division of powers
among the three separate branches. The limitation was found
secondarily in the length of the terms of elected officials. Having
granted Congress the power to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts, and excises by a mere majority vote, and having denied
223. Id. at 678.
224. The Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, supra note 221.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. 1 ELLIOT, supra note 93, at 248; 5 id. at 441.
230. THE FEDERALIST No. 41, supra note 201, at 263.
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the States the power to interfere with the funding of the national
government, clear limits on the taxing power were necessary. The
clauses that addressed the tax abuses of the Crown provided the
limitations on taxing power."l
The history of the General Welfare Clause at the Philadelphia
Convention lends some weight to Madison's views. The General
Welfare Clause was entered into the draft of the Constitution
during the latter half of the Convention and after the most serious
disputes dividing the states had been resolved. After the
Randolph, Bedford, and Pinckney proposals were referred to the
Committee on Detail, the August 6th Report of the Committee
proposed that "[t]he legislature of the United States shall have the
power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises."2 32 The
Convention approved the draft language on August 16, 1787.2u
On August 18, 1787, the Convention heard the argument that
the new government should reassure the debtors of the old, and
that language to that effect ought to be inserted in the
Constitution.234 Charles Pinckney moved that the powers "[t]o
secure the payment of the public debt" and "[t]o secure all
creditors, under the new Constitution, from a violation of the
public faith, when pledged by the authority of the legislature,"
among others, be added to the powers of Congress. 235  The
Convention referred these to the Committee on Detail, chaired by
John Rutledge.' John Rutledge then asked the Convention to
appoint a committee to "consider the necessity and expediency of
the debts of the several states being assumed by the United
States."2u7 Rutledge argued that the states might find the taxing
power more palatable if the new government would assume their
Revolutionary War debts.'m
The Convention appointed a committee consisting of one
member from each state to consider the proposal.u9  John
231. See infra Part VI for a discussion of the General Welfare Clause as a
limitation on the power to tax.
232. 1 ELLIOT, supra note 93, at 226. Additional clauses of Section 1
enumerated other legislative powers. Id. Many of these passed into the final
draft without change. See id. at 226-27 (providing examples of the
constitutional draft language that has remained relatively unchanged).
233. Id. at 245.
234. Id. at 247.
235. Id. at 247-48.
236. Id. at 248; DOCUMENTARY, supra note 105, at xlvii.
237. 1 ELLIOT, supra note 93, at 248.
238. 5 id. at 441.
239. 1 id. at 248. This committee was later referred to as the Committee of
Eleven. Id. at 253. That title leads to some confusion in the Journal. By the
time the Convention adjourned, five Committees of Eleven had been appointed
to consider various matters. See id. at 248 (consisting of Langdon, King,
Sherman, Livingston, Clymer, Dickinson, M'Henry, Mason, Williamson,
Pickney and Baldwin); id. at 256 (consisting of Langdon, King, Johnston,
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Dickinson represented Delaware on the Committee, which was
chaired by Governor Livingston. ° , The drafting of provisions to
address the pre-existing national debt and the debts of the
Revolution took parallel courses in separate committees. On
August 22, 1787, Rutledge laid the proposal of the Committee on
Detail regarding debts of the Confederation before the
Convention. 1 Among other things, the Committee recommended:
[a]t the end of the 1st clause of the 1st section of the 7th article, add,
'for payment of the debts and necessary expenses of the United
States, provided, that no law for raising any branch of revenue,
except what may be specially appropriated for the payment of
interest on debts or loans, shall continue in force for more than[r_ years. '
The Convention deferred consideration of the Rutledge
Committee's proposal in order to study it and also to consider the
proposal of the Livingston Committee of Eleven. The proposal
Governor Livingston had reported the day before stated:
[tihe legislature of the United States shall have power to fulfil the
engagements which have been entered into by Congress, and to
discharge, as well the debts of the United States, as the debts
incurred by the several states, during the late war, for the common
243defence and general welfare.
Gouverneur Morris moved to amend the Livingston
Committee's proposal to provide, "[t]he legislature shall fulfil the
engagements and discharge the debts of the United States."244
This proposition was approved unanimously. 5 The next day, the
State Debts Clause was added to Article VII, Section 1, Clause 1
by the following amendment: "It]he legislature shall fulfil the
engagements, and discharge the debts, of the United States, and
shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and
Livingston, Clymer, Dickinson, Martin, Madison, Williamson, Pickney and
Baldwin); id. at 266 (consisting of Langdon, Gorham, Sherman, Dayton,
Fitzsimons, Read, Carroll, Mason, Williamson, Butler and Few); id. at 280
(consisting of Gilman, King, Sherman, Brearly, Morris, Dickinson, Carroll,
Madison, Williamson, Butler and Baldwin); 5 id. at 461 (consisting of
Langdon, King, Johnson, Livingston, Clymer, Dickinson, Martin, Madison,
Williamson, Pickney and Baldwin). For clarity, this Article refers to each
committee by its chairman.
240. 1 ELLIOT, supra note 93, at 248.
241. Id. at 256.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 254; 5 id. at 451. This is the first indication of the pedigree of the
General Welfare Clause.
244. 1 id. at 258. Madison reported that the proposed language was, "[t]he
legislature shall discharge the debts, and fulfil the engagements, of the United
States." 5 id. at 464.
245. 1 ELLIOT, supra note 93, at 258.
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excises. A6
Whatever the intent of the Convention may have been, the
language proposed by the Livingston Committee, and as amended,
encompassed both the Revolutionary War debts as well as the
debts of the Confederation. The increased scope of the provision
was reflected in the August 25th debate." At this point, the
debate in the Convention revolved around the redemption of the
securities issued during the Revolution. One faction supported
denying full value to speculators.2 The other faction opposed that
approach as damaging to the credit of the new nation.29
The debate was set aside on August 25th, and the Convention
turned to the question of ensuring the debts of the
Confederation." ° Randolph proposed, and the members approved,
this amendment to the proposal of the Committee on Detail: "[a]ll
debts contracted, and engagements entered into, by or under the
authority of Congress, shall be as valid against the United States
under this Constitution as under the Confederation."25
That question being settled for the time being, Sherman
dwelled on the old debts issue.
Mr. SHERMAN thought it necessary to connect with the clause for
laying taxes, duties, &c., an express provision for the object of the
old debts, &c., and moved to add to the first clause of article 7, sect
1,
'for the payment of said debts, and for the defraying the expenses
that shall be incurred for the common defence and general
welfare.'
252The proposition, as being unnecessary, was disagreed to ....
No further action was taken on the State debts until August
31st, when the Convention assigned to a new Committee of
Eleven 25 3 the work of cleaning up and reporting on "such part of
reports as have not been acted on."' This Committee, chaired by
New Jersey Chief Justice David Brearly, included Madison and
John Dickinson. 5 On September 4th, the Brearly Committee
246. Id. at 260.
247. 5 id. at 475-76.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 471, 475-76.
250. 1 ELLIOT, supra note 93, at 264.
251. Id.
252. 5 id. at 476-77. Opponents would point to this defeat as evidence that
no spending power was intended.
253. The Committee consisted of Gilman, King, Sherman, Brearly, G.
Morris, Dickinson, Carroll, Madison, Williamson, Butler, and Baldwin. 1 id.
at 280.
254. Id.
255. 1 ELLIOT, supra note 93, at 280.
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reported, among other things:
That, in their opinion, the following additions and alterations should
be made to the report before the Convention, namely:-
1. The 1st clause of the 1st section of the 7th article to read as
follows: 'The legislature shall have power to lay and collect taxes,
duties, imposts, and excises; to pay the debts, and provide for the
common defence and general welfare, of the United States.'M
This language was approved and referred, with other parts of
the Constitution, to the Committee on Style and Arrangement. On
September 12, the Committee on Style offered a near-final
revision: "[t]he Congress may, by joint ballot, appoint a treasurer.
They shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts,
and excises; to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence
and general welfare, of the United States."
217
For several days following, the Convention fine-tuned the
Report of the Committee on Style. They reduced the veto-override
from a three-fourths to two-thirds vote.2" They removed from
Congress the power to appoint a treasurer.25 They added, "but all
duties, imposts, and excises,.., shall be uniform and equal
throughout the United States[,]" to the first clause of Article 1,
Section 8 and adopted that provision in its final form. 260 Having
first been proposed on August 25, 1787,61 Madison stated that the
final words "were unanimously annexed to the power of
taxation.""2
Although the climax in the general welfare discussion had
passed, some closing scenes followed. On September 14th,
Franklin proposed adding a power "to provide for cutting canals
where deemed necessary."2 ' This proposal was defeated, in part
because some thought the cost would be paid by the union and the
benefit enjoyed by the locale, and in part because some thought
the power unnecessary. In a final salute to the fear of
256. Id. at 283. Madison's notes say, "1. The first clause of article 7, sect. 1,
to read as follows: 'the legislature shall have power to lay and collect taxes,
duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common
defence and general welfare of the United States.'" 5 id. at 506. His footnote
to this provision pointedly says, "* This is an exact copy. The variations in
that in [sic] the printed Journal are occasioned by its incorporation of
subsequent amendments. This remark is applicable to other cases." Id. The
footnote refers to the difference between the Journal entry and Madison's
notes-that being the semi-colon as opposed to the comma.
257. 1 id. at 300.
258. 5 id. at 538.
259. Id. at 542-43.
260. 5 ELLIOT, supra note 93, at 543.
261. Id. at 479.
262. Id. at 543.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 543-44.
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disproportionate taxation, George Read moved to insert "or other
direct tax" after "capitation" in the fourth clause of Section 9.26
"He was afraid that some liberty might otherwise be taken to
saddle the states with a readjustment, by this rule, of past
requisitions of Congress; and that his amendment, by giving
another cast to the meaning, would take away the pretext.,6
So, we see the evolution of the General Welfare Clause in this
way. It arose from the proposal that the new government assume
the Revolutionary War debts of the States.6 7 This proposal made
clear, however, that only those debts incurred for the common
defense and general welfare were to be assumed by the federal
government." The debt proposal was made less specific to ensure
that Revolutionary War securities could be redeemed. 9 The debt
proposal was merged with the power to levy taxes, to make clear
that the new Congress could levy taxes for that purpose.170 That
language, however, would have constricted the scope of Congress'
taxing power."' Since the Confederation's inability to raise funds
was one of the issues that triggered the Convention and because
the taxing power was likely to be one of the more controversial, the
members realized that some would try to construe the provision
strictly. Thus, the Brearly Committee of Eleven added the
familiar language, "to pay the debts and provide for the common
defence and general welfare .... 72 Madison asserted until his
death that this language was intended to do nothing more than
enlarge the scope of the taxing power in order to avoid an inclusio
unius exclusio alterius claim, 73 and that the power of Congress to
spend was found only in the enumerated powers.274
Madison's view is best represented in his 1800 Report on the
Virginia Resolutions, where he addressed both the "weak" and
"strong" Hamiltonian views.2 75 He argued that the effect of either
results in "a government without the limitations formed by a
particular enumeration of powers; and, consequently, the meaning
and effect of this particular enumeration is destroyed by the
265. 5 ELLIOT, supra note 93, at 545.
266. Id.
267. 4 id. at 451.
268. Id. Otherwise, states could tender for payment of indebtedness
incurred for their day-to-day administration. These are also the charges that
would have been paid under the Articles of Confederation. 1 id. at 81.
269. 4 id. at 451.
270. 1 ELLIOT, supra note 93, at 260; 5 id. at 469.
271. Letter from James Madison to Joseph C. Cabell (Oct. 20, 1828),
reprinted in 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 113, at 452.
272. 5 ELLIOT, supra note 93, at 506.
273. See BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 763 (6th ed. 1990) (defining inclusio
unius exclusio alterius as "[tihe inclusion of one is the exclusion of another").
274. 4 ELLIOT, supra note 93, at 552.
275. Id. at 546-80.
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exposition given to these general phrases."276  Madison then
articulated his view.
The true and fair construction of this expression, both in the original
and existing federal compacts, appears to the committee too obvious
to be mistaken. In both, the Congress is authorized to provide
money for the common defence and general welfare. In both is
subjoined to this authority an enumeration of the cases to which
their powers shall extend. Money cannot be applied to the general
welfare, otherwise than by an application of it to some particular
measure, conducive to the general welfare. Whenever, therefore,
money has been raised by the general authority, and is to be applied
to a particular measure, a question arises whether the particular
measure be within the enumerated authorities vested in Congress.
If it be, the money requisite for it may be applied to it. If it be not,
no such application can be made. This fair and obvious
interpretation coincides with, and is enforced by, the clause in the
Constitution which declares that "no money shall be drawn from the
treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law." An
appropriation of money to the general welfare would be deemed
rather a mockery than an observance of this constitutional
injunction. 277
He argued that the clause was intended to do nothing more than
provide for the payment of the debts of the Revolution.7 6 He felt
that it simply reflected the disagreements of the members of the
Convention upon how to make payments. 279 He went on to state:
[b]ut it is to be emphatically remarked, that in the multitude of
motions, propositions, and amendments, there is not a single one
having reference to the terms "common defence & general welfare",
unless we were so to understand the proposition containing them,
made on Aug. 25. which was disagreed to by all the States except
280
one.
The obvious conclusion to which we are brought is, that these terms
copied from the Articles of Confederation, were regarded in the new
as in the old Instrument merely as general terms, explained &
limited by the subjoined specifications; and therefore requiring no
276. Id. at 552.
277. Id.
278. 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 113, at 452-54.
279. Id. at 454. In fact, payment of state debts was one of the first orders of
business for the new Republic. See Act of Aug. 4, 1790, 1 Stat. 178 (1790)
(establishing a post office); Act of May 31, 1794, 1 Stat. 371 (1794) (settling
overdue accounts between the United States and individual states). See also
Currie, supra note 132, at 806-07 for further discussion.
280. 3 RECORDS, supra note 107, at 487 (citation omitted). The clause
proposed on August 25, 1787 provided "for the payment of said debts, [entered
into by the Confederation] and for the defraying the expences that shall be
incurred for the common defence and general welfare." 2 id. at 408, 414. See
also 1 ELLIOT, supra note 93, at 264; 5 id. at 477 (containing the same quote).
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critical attention or studied precaution.2
Madison concluded by responding to arguments that it was
the practice of the Revolutionary Congress to spend generally,
without regard to enumerated powers."' He went on to point out
that while numerous amendments were offered at the time of
ratification and in the First Congress, and that all were aimed at
limiting the power of the national government, not one addressed
the Common Defence and General Welfare Clauses.2"
Furthermore, he argued, while strenuous objections were made to
the limited powers set out in the Constitution, few were made to
what was now argued to be a much broader authority.'
B. Why The Madison Interpretation Is Wrong
In 1800, Madison was willing to admit to a limited spending
power found in Article I, Section 8, Clause 1. It was his view
that, if such a power was to be found in the clause, it was limited
to spending for purposes of the enumerated powers. Madison's
concession, that the spending power might be found in the General
Welfare Clause, proved fatal to his position. As soon as he
conceded that a power to spend may be found in the clause, but is
limited by the enumerated clauses that follow, his interpretation
began to break down. Story criticized it competently.m When the
time came a century later for the Supreme Court to issue its first
authoritative interpretation, Madison's construction lacked
persuasive force. Had he adhered to his earlier stated view, that
the General Welfare Clause was no more than a limitation on the
taxing power and an addition to avoid an inclusio unius exclusio
281. 3 RECORDS, supra note 107, at 487. Madison made the same argument
in his comments on the Bank Bill. James Madison, The Bank Bill (Feb. 2,
1791), reprinted in 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 113, at 446.
It was his view that the establishment of a national bank was not within the
powers granted Congress. He stated:
[n]o argument could be drawn from the terms 'common defence, and
general welfare." The power as to these general purposes, was limited
to acts laying taxes for them; and the general purposes themselves were
limited and explained by the particular enumeration subjoined. To
understand these terms in any sense, that would justify the power in
question [to establish a National Bank], would give to Congress an
unlimited power; would render nugatory the enumeration of particular
powers; would supercede all the powers reserved to the state
governments. These terms are copies from the articles of confederation;
had it ever been pretended, that they were to be understood otherwise
than as here explained?
Id.
282. 3 RECORDS, supra note 107, at 489-90.
283. Id. at 490.
284. Id. at 489-90.
285. 4 ELLIOT, supra note 93, at 552.
286. 1 STORY, supra note 4, §§ 911-18.
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alterius claim,"' his interpretation would have carried more
persuasive power.
Madison's view suffered from other shortcomings. It was too
narrow. He granted only to Congress the powers in the
enumerated clauses together with all means "necessary and
proper" to carry them out.m Madison seemed to overlook the
Necessary and Proper Clause's application to the other branches.
While debts might be paid by congressional appropriation, the
ability to incur debts was not limited to the legislative branch.
Let us consider some examples. The Executive holds the
inherent power, as Commander-in-Chief, to resist invasions.m
Congress, however, may call forth the militia and may declare war
against the invader.20 The Executive's power to resist an invasion
does not arise because of an appropriation by Congress or from
any other congressional authorization. It comes directly from the
Constitution. When the Executive, acting as Commander in Chief,
resists invasion, he incurs debts that inure to the Union.2' Some
of these debts may pay for munitions, others may be for the repair
of war damage. 2 The first class of debts is incurred for the
common defence. The second class is incurred for the common
defence and general welfare, the theory being that one region of
the country has sacrificed for the general welfare of the rest by
bearing the brunt of the invasion. These debts may be incurred
without prior congressional appropriation.
The appropriation to pay the debts may come after the
invasion or insurrection has been defeated. Congress, for example,
appropriated funds in order to aid officers and citizens who lost
property while resisting the Whiskey Rebellion.s The power to
287. See supra note 273 for the definition of inclusio unius exclusio alterius.
288. 4 ELLIOT, supra note 93, at 552.
289. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. IV, § 4.
290. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 11 & 15.
291. See ANNALS OF CONG. 901-02 (Feb. 28, 1793) (expressing the view that
the executive may, in an emergency, spend outside the scope of an
appropriation and incur debts for which funds have not been appropriated);
Currie, supra note 132, at 26 (noting that President Washington incurred
debts in suppressing the Whiskey Rebellion, expecting that Congress would
appropriate funds to pay them).
292. See Act of Feb. 27, 1795, 1 Stat. 423 (1795); ANNALS OF CONG. 794 (Nov.
20, 1794); id. 996 (Dec. 17, 1794); Act of Dec. 31, 1794, 1 Stat. 404 (1845)
(appropriating funds to pay costs of employing militia to suppress the Whiskey
Rebellion).
293. Act of Feb. 27, 1795, 1 Stat. 423 (1794).
Congress appropriated "$8,500 to be applied by him [the President] to
aid such officers of government and other citizens, who have (in
consequence of their exertions in support of the laws) sustained losses in
their property, by the actual destruction thereof, by the insurgents in
the western counties of Pennsylvania, as, in his opinion, stand in need
of immediate assistance, to be them accounted for, in such manner, as
may hereafter be directed by law."
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pay for the munitions expended, to resist the invasion, or to pay
for the damages suffered by citizens on the frontier, does not
depend upon the Common Defence and General Welfare Clause.
Rather, those powers are inherent in the Executive's power to
resist invasion. Congress, however, may decline to pay those bills
at its discretion.
Similarly, should Congress declare war, its authority to pay
for repair of war-damaged buildings, an appropriation for the
general welfare, would come from the war power. As with the first
example, the General Welfare Clause is not necessary to properly
implement the appropriation.
The States retain the power to officer and train their
militias. 4 Not being prohibited (except when called into service
for the United States), the States retain the power to employ their
militia to resist invasions and to suppress insurrections.25  The
States could seek to have Congress appropriate funds to defray
these expenses. Congressional power to appropriate funds to
defray those expenses would not come from the General Welfare
Clause. It is the Necessary and Proper Clause that ensures
congressional power to appropriate funds to promote energy "in
the execution of the laws."'
In the arena of spending, the Necessary and Proper Clause
performs, or may perform, all the labor required by the
enumerated clauses of the Constitution, whether they are in
Article I or not. With respect to the enumerated powers, the
General Welfare Clause performs no work. 7 In this sense, then,
Madison was wrong. An implied power to spend pursuant to the
enumerated powers, lodged in the General Welfare Clause, makes
no sense when a clearer statement of that power may be found in
the Necessary and Proper Clause. In this sense, Story's critique
was accurate. Under Madison's interpretation, the General
Welfare Clause would be rendered a nullity.
Story criticized Madison's view that the clause was neither an
independent power to legislate nor an independent power to apply
revenues."8 He stated that Madison's interpretation was "neither
more nor less, than an attempt to obliterate from the constitution
the whole clause, 'to pay the debts, and provide for the common
defence and general welfare of the United States,' as entirely
Id.
294. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
295. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
296. ANNALS OF CONG. 995-96 (Dec. 17, 1794). See Currie, supra note 132,
at 26 n.136 (discussing remarks of Representative Hartley regarding the
Reparations Bill). The power is granted by U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id.
art. II, § 3; id. art. IV, § 4.
297. 2 STORY, supra note 4, § 915. This was one of Story's chief criticisms of
Madison's view. 1 id. § 916.
298. Id. § 917.
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senseless, or inexpressive of any intention whatsoever."2 9  Story
ridiculed the idea that the Taxing Clause was a grant of general
power, limited by the enumerated powers that followed it in
Section 1.301 Story continued,
[i]t is no sufficient answer to say, that the clause ought to be
regarded, merely as containing "general terms, explained and
limited, by the subjoined specifications, and therefore requiring no
critical attention, or studied precaution;" because it is assuming the
very point in controversy, to assert, that the clause is connected
with any subsequent specifications. It is not said, to "provide for the
common defence, and general welfare, in manner following, viz.,"
which would be the natural expression, to indicate such an
intention. 31
He then attacked Madison's explanation that the general
welfare phrase originated in the Articles of Confederation, where
the Articles were not understood to be a grant of power."0 2 He
argued that "[there is not, however, any solid ground, upon which
it can be for a moment maintained, that the language of the
constitution is to be enlarged, or restricted by the language of the
confederation."" 3 In the next section of his Commentaries, Story
contended that the failure of the Confederation and the rejection of
its more limited powers by the Philadelphia Convention, militated
against Madison's incorporation of the Articles' understanding of
the General Welfare Clause.3°  Finally, Story directly addressed
Madison's contention that money may not be applied to the
general welfare other than through or as part of the exercise of the
enumerated powers. He stated:
[s]tripped of the ingenious texture, by which this argument is
disguised, it is neither more nor less, than an attempt to obliterate
from the constitution the whole clause, "to pay the debts, and
provide for the "common defence and general welfare of the United
"States," as entirely senseless, or inexpressive of any intention
whatsoever. Strike them out, and the constitution is exactly what
the argument contends for. It is, therefore, an argument, that the
words ought not to be in the constitution; because if they are, and
have any meaning, they enlarge it beyond the scope of certain other
enumerated powers, and this is both mischievous and dangerous.
Being in the constitution, they are to be deemed, vox et preterea
nihil, an empty sound and vain phraseology, a finger-board pointing
to other powers, but having no use whatsoever, since these powers
299. Id. § 916.
300. Id. §§ 907-08.
301. Id. § 910 (citations omitted).
302. See Madison's Report on the Virginia Resolutions (1799-1800), reprinted
in 4 ELLIOT, supra note 93, at 551-52.
303. 2 STORY, supra note 4, § 911.
304. Id. § 912.
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are sufficiently apparent without.30 5
This construction or perception of Madison's view carried the
day in 1936. Madison's view was tendered to the Supreme Court
in Butler, not by the Respondent, but by an amicus."° Not
surprisingly, considering Chief Justice Hughes' long-standing view
of the General Welfare Clause, the Court did not adopt it.3"7
Madison's position was defeated by his concession that the
General Welfare Clause conferred a limited power to spend. As a
result of text and history, Madison stated his position in a form
that was readily criticized. It was the text that led to efforts to
expand, rather than to restrict congressional power. This would
seem unavoidable, since Congress, once it was empowered to do
something, would attempt to do more. Historically, the changes in
the needs of the Republic ensured that Congress raised questions
concerning the Spending Clause in the form of an attempt to
create and expand a spending power. This meant that Madison's
argument would always be offered to defeat attempts to expand
congressional power. As a result of this history, Madison would
repeatedly expound his view in an effort to oppose the construction
proposed by the Federalists and, in particular, by Alexander
Hamilton.0 8 Had the dispute been over Congress' power to tax or
spend in furtherance of any enumerated power (as it was in the
early Congresses), the form and language of the debate would have
been different and Madison's view might have prevailed.
In the end, however, Story was correct. When Madison
contended, "Congress is authorized to provide money for the
common defence and general welfare,""° his construction of the
General Welfare Clause was that of a "finger-board" pointing to
the enumerated powers. 310 Nevertheless, Madison's defeat is not
necessarily Story's victory.
305. Id. § 916 (citations omitted).
306. Brief filed by Malcolm Donald as Amicus Curiae on behalf of the
National Association of Cotton Manufacturers at 70, United States v. Butler,
297 U.S. 1 (1936) (No. 401), reprinted in 30 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 119,
at 762.
307. Butler, 297 U.S. at 78. Hughes had certainly adopted Story's
interpretation 20 years earlier in his opinion regarding the bonds issued by
the Federal Land Banks. Letter from Charles E. Hughes to Alexander Brown
& Sons 8-17 (May 4, 1917) (on file with The John Marshall Law Review). He
argued the same view in Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180,
195-96 (1921).
308. See discussion supra Part III for a complete analysis of the Hamiltonian
interpretation.
309. 4 ELLIOT, supra note 93, at 552.
310. 2 STORY, supra note 4, § 916.
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V. THE "W VEAK" HAMILTONIAN OR STORY INTERPRETATION
A. The Interpretation Itself
The next step down from a general grant of the power to
provide for the general welfare is a grant of power to spend for the
general welfare. This is the "weak" Hamiltonian or Story
interpretation, articulated in Hamilton's 1791 Report on
Manufactures."1 ' In his Report, Hamilton urged the aggressive use
of tariffs and subsidies to protect and encourage existing and
fledgling industries. He stated:
[a] question has been made concerning the constitutional right of
the Government of the United States to apply this species of
encouragement, but there is certainly no good foundation for such a
question. The National Legislature has express authority "to lay
and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and
provide for the.., general welfare," with no other qualifications
than that "all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States; and that no capitation or other direct
tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to numbers ascertained by a
census or enumeration, taken on the principles prescribed in the
Constitution," and that "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles
exported from any State."
These three qualifications excepted, the power to raise money is
plenary and indefinite, and the objects to which it may be
appropriated are no less comprehensive than the payment of the
public debts, and the providing for the common defense and general
welfare. The terms "general welfare" were doubtless intended to
signify more than was expressed or imported in those which
preceded; otherwise, numerous exigencies incident to the affairs of a
nation would have been left without a provision. The phrase is as
comprehensive as any that could have been used, because it was not
fit that the constitutional authority of the Union to appropriate its
revenues should have been restricted within narrower limits than
the "general welfare," and because this necessarily embraces a vast
variety of particulars, which are susceptible neither of specification
nor of definition.312
Hamilton continued:
[i]t is, therefore, of necessity, left to the discretion of the National
Legislature to pronounce upon the objects which concern the general
welfare, and for which, under that description, an appropriation of
money is requisite and proper. And there seems to be no room for a
doubt that whatever concerns the general interests of learning, of
agriculture, of manufactures, and of commerce, are within the
311. Alexander Hamilton, Report on Manufactures to the House of
Representatives (Dec. 5, 1791), reprinted in 4 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, supra note 138, at 70-198.
312. Id. at 150-51.
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sphere of the national councils, as far as regards an application of313
money.
Story endorsed this view in his Commentaries. He articulated
his theory most briefly in the following passage.
If it [the debts and general welfare clause] is a mere appendage or
qualification of the power to lay taxes, still it involves a power of
general appropriation of the moneys so raised, which indirectly
produces the same result .... [This] position [that there is no
difference between a plenary power to provide and a plenary power
to apply revenue] is not a just conclusion from the premises, which
it states, that it is a qualified power. It is not a logical or a practical
sequence from the premises; it is a non sequitur.314
The "weak" Hamiltonian or Story position consists of three
prongs. First, it holds the General Welfare Clause to be a
limitation on the taxing power.31 Second, it holds that if Congress
has been granted the power to tax "in order" to provide, or for the
purposes of providing, for the general welfare, then this must
include the power to apply revenue for that purpose.3 6  Finally
Congress, as Hamilton and Story argued and Helvering held, has
the exclusive power to determine what is for the general welfare." 7
Before I engage in a critique of the "weak" Hamiltonian or
313. Id. at 151-52.
314. 1 STORY, supra note 4, § 920.
315. 2 id. § 907. See also THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note
138, at 150 (arguing that the term "general welfare" "intended to signify more
than was expressed or imported" because without a broad term many
"exigencies incident to the affairs of a nation" would be left out).
316. 2 STORY, supra note 4, §§ 911, 919-20. See also THE WORKS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 138, at 149 (arguing that the use of public
money to support industry serves a beneficial purpose).
317. 2 STORY, supra note 4, § 909. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640
(1937). Hamilton, however, appeared to be less emphatic about this than
Story. In his opinion regarding the power to establish a national bank, he
stated:
[i]t is true that they cannot without a breach of trust lay taxes for any
other purpose than the general welfare; but so neither can any other
government. The welfare of the community is the only legitimate end
for which money can be raised on the community. Congress can be
considered as under only one restriction which does not apply to other
governments-they cannot rightfully apply the money they raise to any
purpose merely or purely local. But, with this exception, they have as
large a discretion in relation to the application of money as any
Legislature whatever. The constitutional test of a right application must
always be, whether it be for a purpose of general or local nature. If the
former, there can be no want of constitutional power. The quality of the
object, as how far it will really promote or not the welfare of the Union,
must be a matter of conscientious discretion, and the arguments for or
against a measure in this light must be arguments concerning
expediency or inexpediency, not constitutional right.
3 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 138, at 484-85.
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Story position, we should consider what it does not encompass. As
we saw above, the power of the national government to regulate
international and interstate commerce by means of duties,
imposts, and excises was undoubted at the time of the
Philadelphia Convention. When the Supreme Court said the
power to tax is the power to destroy,3" it could also have said that
the power to regulate is the power to prohibit.30 Thus, Congress is
free to lay prohibitive duties for purposes other than raising
revenue. Its laying of such duties would be to provide for the
general welfare as a matter of regulation, not as a matter of
revenue. Hamilton's position extends beyond that power, however.
He articulated this clearly in his Opinion on the National Bank in
which he stated, "[w]hatever relates to the general order of the
finances, to the general interests of trade, etc., being general
objects, are constitutional ones for the application of money.""'
B. Why the "Weak" Hamiltonian or Story Interpretation Is Wrong
In order to determine why the "weak" Hamiltonian or Story
interpretation is wrong, one must ask himself, does this view
comport with the text? Let us segregate and examine the text of
the first clause. "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,""' would, standing alone,
grant a plenary and unlimited power to impose and collect taxes,
etc. The question then becomes, what is the purpose of the
following phrase, "to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States... [?]."
We have previously concluded that the second phrase is not
an independent grant of power. Thus, the second phrase performs
work only if it modifies the first. As a modification, is it a
limitation or an extension of power? Story tells us that it is both.
That is, he agrees that Congress may not tax except to pay the
debts and provide for the defense and the general welfare. 24
Congress may not lay and collect taxes for any other purpose.325
318. See supra Part I for a discussion of taxes, duties and imposts.
319. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 433-34 (1819).
320. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 358-59 (1903).
321. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion as to the Constitutionality of the Bank of
the United States (Feb. 23, 1791), reprinted in 3 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, supra note 138, at 485. The Avalon Project, Hamilton's Opinion as
to the Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States, 1791 (last modified
Sept. 14, 1999) <http://www.yale.edu./ lawweb/avalon/amerdoc/bank-ah.htm>.
322. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
323. Id.
324. 2 STORY, supra note 4, § 911.
325. Id. This is not to say that Congress may not impose taxes within the
scope of this limitation for other purposes. For example, Congress could
impose a prohibitive tax upon cigarettes for the primary purpose of raising
funds for defense, and for the secondary (or primary) purpose of limiting the
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But once Congress collects revenues, it may appropriate them for
326these general purposes.
How is taxing for the general welfare a limitation on scope?
The short answer is that Congress can tax for national, but not for
local, purposes. The General Welfare Clause was a reaction to
perceived and actual abuses by Parliament and the English
monarchy. In the same way, the States wanted to ensure that
Congress did not tax one state or one region for the benefit of the
others.327 This theme, varied in the final phrase of Clause 1,326 is
repeated throughout the Constitution and, as a matter of history,
appeared most strongly in the Resolutions of the Stamp Act
Congress .329
Nevertheless, Story's view, that the clause is also an
extension of power, conflicts with the organization and structure of
the remaining clauses and sections. Remember, the clauses of
Section 8 follow a standardized structure. Each clause grants
either a plenary power or grants a power followed by limits on the
power. The commerce power is self-limited to commerce between
the states, with the Indian tribes, and foreign nations.3 30  The
Copyright Clause is of similar effect."' It is not a plenary power to
protect inventions, etc., but describes the limited means by which
this may be done: "by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Rights to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."3
Additionally, Congress has the power "[t]o raise and support
Armies," but may appropriate monies only for a period of two
tobacco industry. The imposition of taxes for other purposes has been labeled
the doctrine of "extraneous ends" by Professor David E. Engdahl. Engdahl,
supra note 34, at 16-26. This doctrine, however, is an unnecessary doctrine.
Since the power to lay "Duties, Imposts, and Excises" is a direct power to
regulate-to prevent people from acquiring property-the regulatory power is
a primary, not an extraneous purpose.
326. 1 STORY, supra note 4, § 923.
327. Congress could tax goods found only in one region. However, the excise
would end up affecting the rest of the nation. For example, snuff users in New
York would end up paying a higher price for their snuff. See Hylton v. United
States, 3 U.S. 171, 174 (1796) (providing an example of a carriage tax to
demonstrate that owners of carriages in one state would pay more than
owners of carriages in another state). In contrast, Congress could not impose
a tax on all goods produced in states that legalized slavery or on all goods sold
in the State of New York. Id. at 174-75. Such a tax would violate both the
Uniformity and the General Welfare Clauses. Id. at 174.
328. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. Clause 1 states, "but all Duties, Imposts
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." Id.
329. Resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress (Oct. 19, 1765), reprinted in
SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 91, at 270-71.
330. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
331. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
332. Id.
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years at a time.333 Congress may "provide for [the] organizing,
arming, and disciplining" of the militia,3u powers that are also self-
limited by the phrases that follow within the clause.
This is the scheme of Section 8.3" Either plenary powers are
granted, or limited powers are granted, with the limitation
appearing in the same clause that grants the power. If we are to
accept Story's construction, we must deviate from this scheme and
hold that Clause 1 is the grant of a power not merely limited, but
also expanded by the limiting phrases that follow. Of the clauses
in Section 8, only the General Welfare Clause is viewed as both a
limitation and an implied power.
If we assume that the power to tax is also the power to spend,
then many of the limitations in the clauses that follow lose their
meaning. Story's view enlarges powers that are expressly limited.
For example, Congress has the power to promote the sciences and
arts, but that power is limited to a system of patents and
copyrights. Story's interpretation enlarges the power by
authorizing Congress to give money to artists and scientists, doing
violence to the express limitation of the clause.
Finally, in the last prong of Story's view, we see the argument
break down as a result of its own structure. If "provide for the
common defence and general welfare" is a limitation on the power
of Congress, but Congress has the unlimited power to determine
the general welfare, then the clause is no limitation at all.
Thus, the General Welfare Clause can perform no function,
other than that of a limitation on the taxing power, without doing
violence to the rest of the Constitution. Story argued that a grant
of plenary power to provide for the general welfare (the "strong"
Hamiltonian position) made no sense in light of the enumerated
and specific powers that followed.336 His own view is subject to the
same criticism. A grant of plenary power to spend for the general
welfare makes no sense in light of the enumerated and specific
powers to spend that follow it.
Such is the origin, explanation, and criticism of the three
views. The "strong" Hamiltonian interpretation that Congress
could legislate for the general welfare failed chiefly because it was
not supported by any reasonable construction of the Constitution's
text. Madison's interpretation, that Congress could spend (or
appropriate) money only in the furtherance of the powers
expressly granted by the Constitution, as expanded by the
Necessary and Proper Clause, failed partly because of the form
taken by the debate and partly because Story's critique was valid.
The "weak" Hamiltonian or Story interpretation prevailed because
333. Id. art. I, § 8, c. 12.
334. Id. art. I, § 8, c. 16.
335. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
336. 2 STORY, supra note 4, § 909.
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it was authoritatively set forth by Story, because Story's
construction had never been seriously critiqued, and because the
evolution of the nation rendered Madison's construction obsolete.
This is how Hamilton's and Story's view, that Congress may spend
for the general welfare and that Congress has the exclusive
authority to determine what constitutes the general welfare, came
to triumph in United States v. Butler,"s Helvering v. Davis,sm and
South Dakota v. Dole. 9
The differences between the Hamilton/Story and Madison
interpretations encompass more than the meaning of the General
Welfare Clause. Madison spoke of original intent. This was an "I
Was There" argument and it foundered on the shoals of the text.
Story and Hamilton, in contrast, spoke of original meaning and
their argument was more enduring. As a matter of text, and as a
matter of intent, this Article concludes that the General Welfare
Clause acts differently than either Madison or Story argued.
VI. ORIGINAL INTENT V. ORIGINAL MEANING: THE GENERAL
WELFARE CLAUSE AS A LIMITATION ON THE TAXING POWER
The General Welfare Clause was not inserted into the
Constitution accidentally. It appears in the Tax Clause for the
same reason it was set forth in the Articles of Confederation. It
reflected the Convention's knowledge of history, the experience of
its members, and the experience of the Colonies before the
Revolution. It was inserted as a limitation on the power to raise
revenue.
The Crown's abuses of the taxing power were well known.
They extended over centuries. Each form of abuse was addressed
by its own clause in the Constitution, as much out of fear of
tyranny as out of the States' regional jealousies.
In Edward I's reign, the monarch had the authority to grant
taxing powers to individuals and to municipalities.' ° Monarchs
exercised this power liberally, conferring it on favorites. These
grants often resulted in non-uniform levies that did not benefit the
nation as a whole.i
During his reign, James I began the abuse of the practice of
impositions, duties not authorized by Parliament, and the use of
privy seals, which were coercive appeals for donations. 2' 2 These
were used "not only to meet the expenditures of the kingdom but
also to satisfy the lavish generosity he customarily bestowed upon
337. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
338. 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
339. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
340. 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 662-63 (Legal Classics ed. 1982).
341. Id.
342. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 91, at 63.
1999]
The John Marshall Law Review
court favorites. "  ; . ,
In 1625, during Charles I's reign, Parliament refused supplies
to the King to demonstrate its objection to his prosecution of the
war with Spain.' As a result, the King dissolved Parliament in
1626 and resorted to prerogative taxes to raise money.345 The
Crown also compelled the quartering of soldiers as a money-saving
measure. As with his father, Charles I's prerogative levies
included impositions, privy seals,. and a new form of compelled
loans, which a number of the nobility refused to pay. 7 This
resulted in their imprisonment and lead to Darnell's Case,
sometimes referred to as the Five Knight's Case.3s By 1628, when
Parliament next met, seventy-six people, including some members
of Parliament, had been imprisoned. 9
Parliament condemned taxation without its consent, stating
"no Tax, Tallage, Loan, Benevolence, or other like Charge ought to
be commanded, or levied by the King, or any of his Ministers,
without common consent by Act of Parliament."3 5 This resolution
was later revised and embodied in the Petition of Right (which was
approved by Charles I), stating "no man hereafter be compelled to
make or yield any gift, loan, benevolence, tax, or such-like charge,
without common consent by act of parliament."35' Parliament later
condemned the King's continued collection of tonnage duties,
which had not been authorized by Parliament and also had not
been mentioned in the Petition of Right.35 In response, Charles I
dissolved Parliament in 1629.353
For the next eleven years, in the Parliament's absence, the
Crown continued to levy duties and other forms of taxation by
prerogative. 3 Charles I exacted "ship money," a tax that had
evolved from the requirement that ports provide ships for the
King's use.355 "Ship money" was soon extended to inland counties
and bore no relationship to defense.35 His subjects objected to
these and other abuses, and Charles I eventually lost his head
over the matter in 1649.357
343. Id.
344. Id. at 63-64.
345. Id. at 64.
346. Id. at 65.
347. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 91, at 64-65.
348. Id.; 3 COBBErT'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 1 (London, R.
Bagshaw 1809) [hereinafter COBBETT'S STATE TRIALS].
349. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 91, at 65.
350. Id. at 66 n.13.
351. Id. at 75.
352. Id. at 70.
353. Id.
354. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 91, at 70.
355. Id. at 70 n.29.
356. Id.
357. CHRISTOPHER HIBBERT, CHARLES I 280 (1968).
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"Ship money" was a pejorative in the Colonies and in the post-
Revolutionary states. When Fairfax County met to instruct its
burgesses on the Confederation's proposed 1783 finance plan, they
contended that it "contained the same arguments that were
formerly used in the 'business of ship money' and to justify the
arbitrary measures of the 'race of Stuarts in England."'
Hampden's Case,359 which challenged the ship money levies, was
viewed as a palladium of liberty in the Colonies. Both Franklin'
and Dickinson"' compared the Townshend Duties to "ship money"
and pointed to Hampden's Case as a beacon in the English fight
for liberty. 2
Following the Restoration in 1660, abuses of the prerogative
taxing power resumed.wm Both Charles II and James II resorted to
prerogative taxation.' The Bill of Rights of 1689365 complained
that James II had subverted the laws and liberties "[b]y levying
money for and to the use of the crown, by pretence of prerogative,
for other time, and in other manner, than the same was granted
by parliament."m
Between the reign of William of Orange and George III, little
controversy over taxation is reported.3 7  Parliament had not
suspended supplies to the Crown since the Glorious Revolution.'
Notably, it was in George III's reign that the sovereign attempted
to recover his prerogative taxing power from Parliament. 9  He
urged that the Colonies be taxed and encouraged the proceedings
against John Wilkes when Wilkes opposed him.370  In 1779,
358. MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
DURING THE CONFEDERATION 1781-1789, 410 (1981).
359. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 91, at 70 n.29. Hampden
objected to the assessment on the ground that the King was taking his goods
without consent. COBBETT'S STATE TRIALS, supra note 348, at 825. He
refused to pay a 20 s. assessment and was sued for it. Id. at 846, 857. The
Court of the Exchequer eventually heard the case, and ordered Hampden to
pay the taxes. Id. at 1252. Parliament responded by overturning the holding
and impeaching and removing the judges. Id. at 1283.
360. Benjamin Franklin, Queries for the London Chronicle (Aug. 18, 1768),
reprinted in WRITINGS, supra note 206, at 633-34.
361. 1 DICKINSON, supra note 58, at 311.
362. See supra notes 360-61 and accompanying text.
363. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 91, at 227.
364. Id.
365. Bill of Rights (Dec. 16, 1689), reprinted in id. at 245-50.
366. Id. at 245.
367. 1 SIR THOMAS ERSKINE MAY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
ENGLAND 440-41 (New York, A.C. Armstrong & Son, 3d ed. 1889).
368. Id. at 441. May reports that members of Parliament attempted to
suspend supplies in 1781, but the resolution was defeated. Id. at 442-43.
369. Id. at 36.
370. Id.; Case of John Wilkes, reprinted in 19 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF
STATE TRIALS 982, compiled by T.B. Howell (London, Longman, Hurst, Rees,
Orme & Brown 1813); Leach v. Money, reprinted in id. at 1002; Entick v.
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Parliament sought,. according to May, "to correct abuses in the civil
list expenditure, and every other branch of the public revenue.""'
George III retaliated by expelling various members of Parliament
from civil offices. 72 Throughout this period, and until the end of
the war with the Colonies, Parliament complained of and sought to
regain authority over arbitrary spending by the King.7'
The 18th Century, of course, saw the Stamp Act. 74 The
Resolutions of the Stamp Act Congress, drafted by Dickinson,73
complained that Parliament had levied the tax without consent of
the colonists.7 In the Sixth Article of the Resolutions, the Stamp
Act Congress complained that England's taxation of the Colonies
benefited England to the Colonies' detriment.77 Or in other words,
the taxes were not levied for the general welfare.7 Daniel
Dulaney argued:
[t]here is not that intimate and inseparable relation between the
electors of Great Britain and the inhabitants of the colonies which
must inevitably involve both in the same taxation; on the contrary,
not a single elector in England might be immediately affected by a
taxation in America .... Moreover, even Acts oppressive and
injurious to the colonies in an extreme degree might become popular
in England, from the promise or expectation that the very measures
which depressed the colonies, would give ease to the inhabitants of
Great Britain. 79
Thus, the Sixth Article provided:
[t]hat all supplies to the crown, being free gifts of the people, it is
unreasonable and inconsistent with the principles and spirit of the
British constitution, for the people of Great Britain to grant to his
majesty the property of the colonists.383
In the Ninth Article, Congress complained that the various
duties Parliament imposed failed to consider the unique
Carrington, reprinted in id. at 1029; Case of John Wilkes, reprinted in id. at
1075.
371. MAY, supra note 367, at 55.
372. Id. at 36-37.
373. Id. at 59-73.
374. See supra notes 49-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Stamp Act.
375. Jacobson, supra note 90, at 32; SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note
91, at 266.
376. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 91, at 264-65.
377. Id. at 270.
378. Among the propaganda against the Stamp Act was Samuel Adams'
claim that the revenues would be used to bring Catholic Bishops to the
Colonies. THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, supra note 117, at 46.
379. Daniel Dulany, Considerations on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes in
the British Colonies, reprinted in SAMUEL ELLIOT MORISON, SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1764-1788, 27 (1923).
380. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 91, at 270.
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circumstances of the Colonies.Sl It contended that, because Great
Britain compelled them to buy their goods from British sources,
the colonists already provided support to the Crown because the
costs of taxes on those goods were passed on to them. 2
Although the Stamp Act was quickly repealed, the
Townshend Duties gave rise to the same objections. According to
Dickinson, the duties were another attempt to levy taxes for a
revenue without the consent of the Colonies.' He restated the
general welfare argument in his fourth Letter from a Farmer:
[historically,] certain services were rendered to the crown for the
general good .... [Glifts and grants of their own property were
made by the people, under the several names of aids, tallages, tasks,
taxes, and subsidies, &c. These were made, as may be collected
even from the names, for public service upon "need and necessity."
All these sums were levied upon people by virtue of their voluntary
gift. Their design was to support the national honor and interest.
Some of those grants comprehended duties arising from trade; being
imposts on merchandizes. These Lord Chief Justice Coke classes
under "subsidies," and "parliamentary aids." They are also called
"customs." But whatever the name was, they were always
considered as gifts of the people to the crown, to be employed for
public uses."
Dickinson's most vigorous assertion of the general welfare
claim is found in his eighth Letter. In it he argued that the Stamp
Act provided that "the money thereby to be raised, should be
applied 'towards defraying the expences of defending, protecting
and securing the British colonies and plantations in America."M
Dickinson stated that the Townshend Duties, however
impose duties upon British colonies, "to defray the expences of
defending, protecting and securing his Majesty's DOMINIONS in
America."
What a change of words! What an incomputable addition to the
expences intended by the Stamp-Act! "His Majesty's DOMINIONS"
comprehended not only the British colonies, but also the conquered
provinces of Canada and Florida, and the British garrisons of Nova
Scotia; for these do not deserve the name of colonies.
What justice is there in making US pay for "defending, protecting
and securing" THESE PLACES? What benefit can WE, or have WE
ever derived from them? None of them was conquered for US; nor
will "be defended, protected or secured" for US.
381. Id. at 271.
382. Id. at 270-71.
383. 1 DICKINSON, supra note 58, at 312-22.
384. Id. at 329-30 (citations omitted).
385. Id. at 360.
386. Id.
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He signed this letter, "Qui sentit commodum, sentire debet et onus.
They who feel the benefit, ought to feel the burden." 7
In his tenth Letter, Dickinson reviewed the Crown and
Parliament's abuses of the civil lists, stating:
[a]ttempts have been made [sic] to gloss over these gross
encroachments, by this specious argument-" That expending a
competent part of the PUBLIC REVENUE in pensions, from a
principle of charity or generosity, adds to the dignity of the crown;
and is therefore useful to the PUBLIC." To give this argument any
weight, it must appear, that the pensions proceed from charity or
generosity only"-and that it "adds to the dignity of the crown," to
act directly contrary to law."s
Dickinson's letters flamed colonial discontent. His influence
and the retaliatory acts of Parliament led to the 1774 meeting of
the First Continental Congress. Colonial complaints of taxation
without representation and taxation for other than the general
welfare of the Empire were set out in Declaration and Resolves of
the First Continental Congress. 9 The Declaration and Resolves
reflect Dickinson's key arguments.90
The Philadelphia Convention was comprised of delegates who
not only knew this history but had also participated in it. The
Convention knew therefore of the dangers of an unrestricted power
of taxation. The delegates included checks on historic abuses of
the power throughout the text of the Constitution. The principle
that taxes are gifts of the people is reflected in the rule that
revenue measures shall originate in the people's House. 391' Note
that Article I, Section 7, Clause 1 does not say that taxes, duties,
etc. shall originate in the House. 92 This, yet again, distinguishes
the power to levy duties as a form of regulation from the power to
lay taxes, duties, imposts, and excises for purposes of revenue.
The Tax Clause commands "all Duties, Imposts and Excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States."93 These, of
course, are indirect taxes. The uniformity rule preserves
Dickinson's principle that those who share the benefit should
share the burden.9 Because direct taxes, even if "uniform" could
result in heavier burdens on some states, the Constitution also
commands that per capita and other direct taxes be levied in
387. Id. at 364.
388. 1 DICKINSON, supra note 58, at 377-78.
389. Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress (Oct. 14,
1774), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 91, at 286-89.
390. Id. at 287-88.
391. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
392. Id.
393. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
394. 1 DICKINSON, supra note 58, at 364.
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proportion to population. 95
The Constitution forbids taxes on exports.3" To the extent
that this prohibition prevents regional taxation that does not fall
upon the rest of the country, it is redundant. The Constitution
also prohibits preferences for duties among ports. 7 This latter
rule, said Story, "cuts off the power to require that circuity of
voyage, which, under the British colonial system, was employed to
interrupt the American commerce before the Revolution."399
Finally, the Constitution limits withdrawals from the Treasury to
those for which Congress had earlier appropriated funds,
protecting against abuses of spending by the Executive, whether
by prerogative taxation or some other ingenious method. 9'
The Framers, then, went to great lengths to insure that the
new government would not repeat the taxing sins of the old. They
addressed the principal complaints articulated by the Stamp Act
Congress,4' the Pennsylvania Farmer,4"' and the First Continental
Congress,4"2 including the complaint that a tax might be levied on
one region for the benefit of another. 3 They were intentionally
redundant. The General Welfare Clause, like the ports,
uniformity, and proportionality rules, ensures that Congress may
not impose either a tax or a duty in a manner that burdens one
section for the benefit of another. Less specific than the other
three, the General Welfare Clause ensures against novel means of
imposing regional taxation.
If any person's view of the General Welfare Clause is entitled
to deference, it would have to be Dickinson's view. His theory of
the power of taxation provided the principle justification for the
colonial resistance to taxation that led to independence.4"
Dickinson's theory that a national body could not levy taxes for
purposes other than the common defense and the general welfare
was put into practice in his draft of the Articles of Confederation.4 5
Dickinson's views on taxation for the general welfare, set out in
the drafts of the Committees of Eleven (on which he served) would
have to describe the original intent of the authors of the
Constitution.
395. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
396. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
397. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 6.
398. JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 135 (Regenery Gateway, Bicentennial ed. 1986) (1859).
399. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
400. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 91, at 270-71.
401. DICKINSON, supra note 58, at 307-406.
402. SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 91, at 286-89.
403. Id. at 270.
404. Id. at 276.
405. See supra notes 217-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Dickinson's draft proposals.
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But original intent is not the same as original meaning. The
State conventions ratified a written document, not the various and
conflicting thoughts of its authors. Nevertheless, they also ratified
the document with the historical knowledge of the Crown and
Parliament's abuses of the power to tax. It is this same history
that informed the Framers of the meaning of the General Welfare
Clause and it is what informs us.
VII. WHAT INTERPRETATION?
What interpretation is left? If we adopt Story's interpretation
that Congress may spend in any manner it deems in furtherance
of the general welfare, then we must concede that the limitations
to the powers that follow, limitations that appear in the text, are
meaningless. Story's interpretation expands powers that are
expressly self-limiting, thus violating the constitutional text. The
"strong" Hamiltonian interpretation does violence to the text of the
Constitution, as we have seen above and as Story so convincingly
demonstrated. The Madison interpretation, because of its form,
also fails the test of the constitutional text. Story correctly
summed up Madison's view as a "finger-board," pointing to the
other powers.4 So, how then do we interpret the power "[t]o lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts
and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the
United States"?
47
The first conclusion is that the general welfare limitation is
one of many redundancies that appear in the Constitution. It is
another means of saying, "[t]hey who feel the benefit, ought to feel
the burden." °  Reflected in the rules of uniformity and
proportionality, this principle is repeated more broadly in the
general welfare limitation.
Second, the General Welfare Clause is a truism, a
reaffirmation of the power to regulate commerce by means of
duties. That is, we know that the Colonies admitted Parliament's
power to impose regulations through duties and imposts.
Repeatedly they referred to Parliament's power to levy duties as
the power to provide for the general welfare of the Empire.4°9 Had
the Convention omitted the General Welfare Clause from the
power that authorized Congress to lay duties, imposts and excises
to pay the debts, the omission would reasonably have been
construed as a denial of that form of regulatory power.
That said, it is both fair and necessary to subject this
interpretation to the same examination as conducted of the
406. 2 STORY, supra note 4, § 916.
407. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
408. 1 DICKINSON, supra note 58, at 364.
409. See discussion supra Part I.
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Madison, Hamilton, and Story views. This examination is broken
into two cases: taxes for revenue upon which the General Welfare
Clause acts as a limitation, and regulatory duties that are deemed
for the general welfare.
A. The First Case: Tax as Revenue
When Congress lays a tax for revenue purposes, several
subcases may arise: (1) the tax revenue may be ear-marked for the
exercise of an enumerated power; (2) the tax bill may ear-mark the
revenue for the exercise of an enumerated power, but the proceeds
may be appropriated for the exercise of another enumerated
power; (3) the tax may not be ear-marked but may be appropriated
in furtherance of an enumerated power; (4) the tax may be ear-
marked, but the proceeds are appropriated "for the general
welfare"; (5) the tax, not ear-marked, may be appropriated "for the
general welfare"; (6) the tax is ear-marked (or not) for a non-
general welfare purpose; and finally, (7) Congress lays a tax on one
region and confers the benefits on another, but not in furtherance
of an enumerated power.
In the first three subcases, Congress spends to further an
enumerated power. Is the General Welfare Clause a limitation in
these instances? I conclude not. Congress may spend locally, the
General Welfare Clause notwithstanding. This power, to spend
locally in furtherance of an enumerated power, defeats the view of
the General Welfare Clause as a spending limitation.
Beginning with the enumerated powers of Congress, we must
observe that the powers are plenary. Congress may exercise them
nearly in any manner they see fit, subject only to the expressed
prohibitions of the Constitution. Consider the power to establish
post offices, since this will illustrate our case. Congress has the
express and unlimited power "It]o establish Post Offices and post
Roads.""' Assume a majority in Congress, to coerce the abolition
of slavery, decided to withhold establishing post offices in
slaveholding states. Having imposed a general tax to, among
other things, pay the costs of the post office department, Congress
would then arguably have levied a tax for a local purpose: to
establish post offices in non-slave states and to coerce the abolition
of slavery in slave-holding states. Therefore, the tax would be
general; the benefit would be (arguably) local.41'
Now assume Congress, in the exercise of its wisdom,
determines that its budget does not permit establishing post
offices in all states. It thus establishes post offices in New York
410. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
411. This Article assumes a local benefit, although it is admittedly argued
that abolition of slavery would be, in Congress's view in this instance, in
furtherance of the general welfare.
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and Massachusetts only. It has laid a general tax to for pay the
costs of establishing the post offices among other things. Non-
beneficiaries would argue that the tax was levied for a local
purpose. The tax again is general, and the benefit local, but
Congress would have to start somewhere in establishing a postal
system and a General Welfare Clause argument against
congressional power in this case would defeat the power expressly
granted to it.
The power to spend, to establish, and to maintain post offices
comes not from the General Welfare Clause, but from Article I,
Section 8, Clause 742 The power is plenary and Congress could
establish only two post offices for budgetary reasons or limit post
offices to non-slave states for extraneous reasons. The General
Welfare Clause does not control Article I, Section 8, Clause 7 .3
Neither does it prohibit the laying of a tax that would confer the
local benefits of a post office.
Congress' enumerated powers, being plenary, may not be
limited by the General Welfare Clause. If we restate the case by
saying that the enumerated powers are those necessary for the
general welfare, then the General Welfare Clause also does not
expand the scope of the enumerated powers. The tax power in
such instances is not limited by the General Welfare Clause.
Laying a tax to support the exercise of enumerated powers always
would be a tax for the common defense or general welfare, even if
the power was exercised locally or for expressly local purposes. I
must conclude that when taxes are laid to carry out any
enumerated powers, the General Welfare Clause does nothing to
expand or to limit either the power to tax or the power to spend in
furtherance of the enumerated power.4
This rule applies to the first three subcases. Later
appropriations to further any enumerated power fall simply within
Congress' power to change its mind and to exercise the power to
appropriate for purposes found in the enumerated powers and the
Necessary and Proper Clause.
It is the fourth subcase that becomes problematic. If the
appropriation is for a "general welfare" purpose not found among
the enumerated powers, then we find no source of power for the
appropriation. It is no solution to claim a spending power in such
an instance, because the tax was for an ear-marked enumerated-
power purpose. At best, the defender of the appropriation could
claim that Congress impliedly amended the tax bill to provide for
the levying of taxes for the general welfare, and therefore the
appropriation is pursuant to the "spending power."
412. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
413. Id.
414. This would include Congress' power to provide for the support of the
various departments of the three branches.
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The fifth subcase arises when the tax is levied for the purpose
of generating revenue to be appropriated for the general welfare.
If the tax is expressly "to provide funds in furtherance of the
general welfare" or to generate revenue for a program not
authorizable under the enumerated powers, but which arguably
furthers the general welfare, then we must again find a spending
power source for the appropriation.
This brings us to the sixth subcase, the case of the
"President's Paramour." In this instance, consider two
hypotheticals. In the first, Congress levies a tax for a non-
enumerated, non-general welfare purpose. In the second,
Congress levies a tax for a purpose authorized by an express
power, but the Executive spends for a non-general welfare
purpose. In this second instance, the role of the General Welfare
Clause, as a limitation on the taxing power, may be examined with
respect to the exercise of powers by the other branches.41 5
Assume that Congress, being especially solicitous of an
extremely powerful and popular Executive, taxes chocolate to
provide income to the "President's paramour" and appropriates the
proceeds for the same purpose. This would be an indirect tax,
uniformly applied but not imposed for the general welfare. In that
instance, we see how the General Welfare Clause operates as a
limitation on the tax, not a limitation on spending. After all,
Presidents may spend money appropriated for their "paramours,"
and nothing in the Constitution would prohibit them from doing
416
So.
We may change the hypothetical to further illustrate how the
other branches may exercise the spending (as opposed to the
appropriation) power. Assume that, to make the "paramour"
happy, the President appoints him or her to a position without
confirmation pursuant to Article II, Section 2, Clause 3.4 . The
position is funded by generally levied taxes. In that case,
Congress has taxed for general welfare purposes. The Executive
appointing the "paramour" has nevertheless spent for an arguably
non-general welfare purpose. The same would be true any time
Congress provides supplies to the Executive branch. The purpose,
supplies for the Executive, is part of the general welfare.418 If the
415. The Executive executes the laws and this requires spending. See
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (holding that grant of power to
Comptroller General to cancel spending items unconstitutionally gave
Legislative branch functions that entailed execution of the laws).
416. Cf Act of Mar. 2, 1797, ch. 6, 1 Stat. 497 (1861) (appropriating funds for
the President's household expenses).
417. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
418. "The three most important articles that our assemblies, or any
legislatures can provide for, are, First-the defence of the society: Secondly-
the administration of justice: And Thirdly-the support of civil government."
1 DICKINSON, supra note 58, at 366.
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Executive employs the funds to pay the paramour-appointee, it is
the President, not Congress, who has arguably spent for a non-
general welfare purpose. Nevertheless, both actions would be
constitutional as both lie within the powers of the respective
branch.
Carrying this further, assume that Congress has made a
general appropriation for purposes of conducting the country's
foreign policy.419  The Executive determines that it is in the
national interest to spend funds "for propagating Mahometanism
among the Turks." ° Congress has taxed for a general purpose-
foreign policy. The Executive has then spent for what Story
considered a purpose not in furtherance of the general welfare.'
21
Congress has the power to appropriate funds in such a way
that it effectively "spends" them.22 But for all practical purposes,
the spending power is properly found in the Executive, who spends
to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."'2 So, we see
that the General Welfare Clause does not act as a check on
executive spending of funds for non-general welfare purposes. The
Executive's power to spend is limited only by the appropriations
injunction of Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 and abstractedly by the
injunction that the Executive "take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed' " and by Congress's power to impeach.
2
1
The final case is self-explanatory. Levying a local tax to
confer a benefit on a different locality violates the general welfare
injunction, but is most likely to be struck down under the easier
uniformity/proportionality rules.
B. The Second Case: Taxation as Regulation
Under the second case, assume that Congress has levied a tax
for regulatory purposes-to discourage the consumption of a
particular item. As a regulation, even a prohibitive duty (i.e., The
Lottery Cases)'12 will be an exercise of the tax power for the general
419. "Appropriation and other acts of Congress are replete with instances of
general appropriations of large amounts, to be allotted and expended as
directed by designated government agencies." Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United
States, 301 U.S. 308, 322 (1937).
420. 1 STORY, supra note 4, § 922.
421. Id.
422. See Train v. New York, 420 U.S. 35, 41 (1975) (holding that provisions
in the Clean Water Act making available 75% of the cost of municipal sewers
and sewage treatment works allows a state administrator to allot less than the
amount appropriated).
423. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 1. See also Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S.
417, 441-45 (1998) (finding the Line Item Veto Act unconstitutional because it
violated the Presentment Clause).
424. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 1.
425. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
426. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 358-59 (1903).
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welfare. What of an impost that is destructive of an industry that
is generally considered beneficial? If the question is one of power
under Article I, Section 8, Clause 1,27 then the power plainly
exists, for the power to lay imposts is plenary and the
determination of the general welfare is left to Congress. With
respect to such injurious duties, we may look to the colonial
protests. While they protested the Sugar Act and other harmful
duties, the colonists did not deny Parliament's power to impose
them as regulations."' The power to lay duties, imposts, and
excises is the power to regulate in order to provide for the general
welfare.
Is it possible for Congress to exercise the regulatory taxing
power for a non-general welfare purpose? This could not happen
without a violation of the Ports Clause, a violation of the
Uniformity Clause, or a violation of the Proportionality Clauses.
Provided that the duty, impost, or excise is uniform, the question
of whether it is levied for the general welfare is a question
committed to the legislative branch."' For instance, a duty on
things imported by one region of the country (i.e. a duty on
imported wheat combines) is uniform if it applies to the entire
United States.40 It is arguably for the general welfare. While that
limited class of farmers or harvesters who buy combines may be
injured by higher prices, domestic manufactures are encouraged.
While such a tax may be criticized on policy grounds as not being
for the general welfare, it would nevertheless be within Congress'
levying power.
If we excise "general welfare" from the Tax Clause, we are
presented with the claim that Congress may not levy duties for
purposes other than paying the debts and providing for the
common defense. Indeed, omitting the general welfare phrase
would eliminate nearly all duties for regulatory purposes. A
strong argument could be made that while Congress might have
the power to regulate foreign and interstate commerce, the
omission of "general welfare" from the Tax Clause was intended to
deny it the power to regulate commerce by means of duties.''
Duties, even while having a general welfare regulatory
purpose, will generate revenue incident to the regulation. The
revenue gives rise to several subcases of appropriations: (1)
appropriations to pay for the cost of the regulation; (2)
appropriations of the excess above the cost of collection to further
any enumerated power; (3) appropriations for the "general
427. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
428. See supra notes 54-72 and accompanying text for examples of when the
Colonies violently protested.
429. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937).
430. Hylton, 3 U.S. at 174-75.
431. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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welfare" not pursuant to an enumerated power; and (4)
appropriations not for the general welfare. It should be apparent
that the first two subcases are well within Congress' powers.
Congress is free to spend in furtherance of any enumerated power.
The third subcase, appropriation "for the general welfare,"
arises when Congress appropriates the excess revenue for a
"general welfare purpose" not found within its enumerated powers.
In that instance, where is the constitutional authority for the
appropriation? The duty, having been levied for a regulatory
purpose, would not readily give rise to a power to spend for the
general welfare. As in the case of the ear-marked tax, the
proponent of the appropriation would be left with an
unsatisfactory and naked claim that Congress has impliedly
amended its taxing measure to provide that the proceeds may be
spent for the general welfare.
The fourth subcase assumes that Congress appropriates for a
non-general welfare purpose. Again that appropriation finds no
source of authority in the Constitution. Its defender is left with
the weak claim that Congress has impliedly amended its taxing
measure and that Congress is the sole determiner of the general
welfare.
We are left, then, with what may be an unsatisfactory
answer. The General Welfare Clause is simply redundant. But it
is intentionally redundant, and no more redundant than many
other clauses of the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The General Welfare Clause reflected one of the Colonies'
deeper concerns-that one region or the whole might be taxed for
the benefit of another. Under the Confederation, the general
welfare principle had been enforced through the super-majority
requirement of the Articles and tacitly through a state's ability to
refuse the requisitions of the Confederation. The Constitution
changed the means of enforcement. The key was the division of
powers-among the branches and between the Houses of
Congress. However, the Convention retained the general welfare
rule and it was enforceable through the new means found in the
Constitution.
Thus, neither Madison nor Story nor Hamilton were fully
correct in their measurement of the General Welfare Clause. The
clause is not a mere introduction to the enumerated powers that
follow. Neither is it a grant of power to spend. It cannot be a
spending power without expanding or eliminating the limitations
on power expressed in the clauses that follow it. The General
Welfare Clause is a nullity when considered solely against
Congress' enumerated powers. But when considered against the
powers granted to the other branches, it makes sense as an
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indirect check on the Executive.
Story's Commentaries were written with at least part of his
eye on the coming storm. The Virginia Resolutions of 1798 and
1799,432 the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, 433 and the South
Carolina Nullification Acts of 1828 and 183244 occurred within
Story's lifetime and prior to his completion of the Commentaries.
They, and Tucker's Blackstone Commentaries, were the tremors
that preceded the general eruption of 1861. Story focused on the
Constitution as the charter of a national government, repeatedly
striking blows against the views that the Constitution represented
a compact among the individual states. Story's views were
repeatedly attacked by Southern states' rights apologists.433 Upon
the Commentaries' publication in 1833, Chief Justice John
Marshall wrote to comment favorably upon them. 436 The coming
division was at the front of his mind as well.
I have finished reading your great work, and wish it could be read
by every statesman, and every would-be statesman in the United
States. It is a comprehensive and an accurate commentary on our
Constitution, formed in the spirit of the original text. In the South,
we are so far gone in political metaphysics, that I fear no
demonstration can restore us to common sense. The word "State
Rights," as expounded by the resolutions of '98 and the report of '99,
construed by our legislature, has a charm against which all
reasoning is vain. Those resolutions and that report constitute the
creed of every politician, who hopes to rise in Virginia; and to
question them, or even to adopt the construction given by their
author [Madison], is deemed political sacrilege. The solemn and
interesting admonitions of your concluding remarks will not, I fear,
avail as they ought to avail against this popular frenzy.437
Consistent with what went on before and with what followed,
slavery infected the interpretation of the General Welfare Clause.
Those who feared the power of the federal government to destroy
the institution, argued strenuously for states' rights, and a weak
federal government. Those like Marshall and Story who foresaw
the destruction of the Union labored mightily and quickly to
432. 4 ELLIOT, supra note 93, at 546-80.
433. Id. at 540-45.
434. Id. at 580-94.
435. See generally ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS, A CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW OF
THE LATE WAR BETWEEN THE STATES 50-81 (Philadelphia, National
Publishing Co. 1868); HENRY ST. GEORGE TUCKER, LECTURES ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Richmond, Shepherd & Colin 1843); ABEL P. UPSHUR,
A BRIEF ENQUIRY INTO THE TRUE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF OUR FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT: BEING A REVIEW OF JUDGE STORY'S COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1971) (1840).
436. Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story (July 31, 1833), reprinted in
2 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 135-36 (Boston, Charles C. Little &
James Brown, 1851).
437. Id.
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entrench federal power. One result was Story's articulation of the
spending power, which prevails today.
The first Part of this Article reviewed the organization and
structure of the Constitution, coming to several conclusions. Key
among them were the observations that the Convention was freely
and intentionally redundant and that a limitation on a power was
included in the same clause as the grant of power. The General
Welfare Clause is an intentionally redundant limit on the tax
power. Forced to choose between Story's interpretation, which has
the effect of expanding enumerated powers beyond their self-
imposed limitations and an interpretation that follows a rule of
intentional redundancy, the latter must prevail.
